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Political socialization: change and stability in political attitudes among and within age cohorts

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POLITICAL SOCIALIZTION: CHANGE AND STABILITY IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG AND WITHIN AGE COHORTS

by

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ABSTRACT

For as long as people have held opinions in the political realm, there has been research trying to decipher exactly what people think and believe as well as when they begin to hold these beliefs. This present study sorts the respondents studied into age cohorts and then follows them throughout the data. All of the data used in this study are from the National Election Study Data from 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. This study is a repeated cross-sectional study since different individuals are used throughout the study, and this study measures opinions only on the aggregate level. Sorting the respondents into age cohorts allows this study to track people of similar age as they respond to different life experiences as well as world events as they age. When appropriate, the data are compared to the main models of political socialization to determine how accurate these generally accepted models are.

The items analyzed in this study vary greatly in subject as well as how specific they are. Everything from United States Presidential vote choices, opinions on affirmative action and federal welfare spending to political knowledge is analyzed to ascertain if these things interact with age, and if they do interact with age, to what extent. Besides observing opinions on these issues, certain issues will have their saliency measured throughout the years using the Somers' D statistic. This will help determine what issues people are thinking of when they are forming their ideology. The results from this paper show that some issues and beliefs, such as self-described ideology and political knowledge, are very strongly related to age. Other issues and beliefs in the

political realm, such as strength of United States Presidential vote choice and opinions on federal welfare spending, seem to not be related to age or influenced heavily by period effects and other things besides age.

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INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no inquiry has been further investigated in political science than that of political socialization. That is, why do people hold the political opinions they have, and when are these opinions acquired? In other words, how are people socialized in the political realm (Clawson and Oxley 29)? And once these opinions are formed, are these opinions uncompromising and acute, or are political feelings and opinions elastic and adjustable? It would seem that it is impossible for every person who is politically socialized to keep every opinion exactly the same throughout their entire lives. So then, for the changes that are observed, what are the magnitude and direction of these changes? Are they random in nature, or does what is happening in the world matter? Asked another way, do events matter? Having these questions answered would help explain the ways in which and when people act in political realms.

It is also important to establish a protocol that defines exactly what change is and the different types of change. The first kind of change is called *cohort succession* (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 35). Cohort succession occurs when there is a change in aggregate opinion due to an addition in the population because of birth and aging, or subtraction of individuals due to death. The second kind of change is called *intracohort change* and it is caused by changes in the characteristics of a population that do not include aging (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 35).

One of the main models that attempts to explain the political socialization process is called the *impressionable years model.* This model says that attitudes are formed during late adolescence and into early adulthood (usually considered to be the ages 17 to 26), and then remain very stable throughout the life span (Erikson and Tedin 132). Put another way, this model

says opinions for the young are somewhat erratic, and by the time people enter into their middle ages, these opinions will be much more stable. According to this model, much more change will occur between the ages 17-26 than will occur between 26- 35, for example. This theory is supported by many prominent political socialization studies, perhaps none more known then the panel study described by Jennings and Niemi in Generations And Politics: A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents. For example, partisanship in 1965 and 1973 had a correlation of .5, when the respondents were 18 and 26. Between the ages of 26-35, this correlation rises to .65 and stays at .65 for the ages of 35 and 50 (Erikson and Tedin 138-139). To put it simply, the data show that after attitudes are formed in the impressionable years they crystallize in late life. But, party identification is widely considered the most stable political orientation, and so these data are not necessarily indicative for any other type of political attitude or characteristic.

A competing model of the *impressionable years model* is the *life-long openness model* (Jennings and Niemi 20). This model basically says that minimal learning at most occurs during the impressionable years. In addition, this model not only says that individuals can change, but that they do change in different types of characteristics. Essentially, this model is the opposite of the *impressionable years model*. In the middle of the *impressionable years model* and the *life-long openness model* is the *life-cycle model* (Jennings and Niemi 20-21). This model says that while persistence should be expected, there are certain characteristics that can change, and indeed, probably will change as people age. For example, the *life-cycle model* can be applied to the tendency of young adults to be liberal, and then more conservative later. Another model between *impressionable years* and *life-long openness* is the *generational model* (Jennings and Niemi 21). This model says that persistence is the rule and changes will not necessarily occur.

Rather, changes should only be expected in response to powerful social and political movements. In the analysis, the *impressionable years model* will be the main theory that the data are compared to, and the *life-long openness model*, the *life-cycle model* and the *generational model* will act as alternative theories when the *impressionable years model* does not fit the data.

The analysis will be an aggregate analysis on collective public opinion since mass opinions and changes will be observed, rather than how individual opinions change over time. It is important to point out that while there could be a lot of change on the individual level, none of this would be apparent in the aggregate analysis. All questions will be answered by using the National Election Study Data. The United States Presidential Elections of 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004 will be the elections that are analyzed in attempting to answer the questions in this study. Since data will be used from different individuals from different times, this analysis is called a *repeated cross-sectional* (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 5). As such, no individual is studied at more than one time and panel-conditioning effects here are of no concern. The protocol that will be used is similar to that used by Paul R. Abramson in Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change (Abramson 53). This means that when age cohorts are formed, the cut off point for each cohort will be seven years where the data allows.

Inquires covered in this study will vary in how specific they are. The first thing that will be explored is a simple look at the presidential elections broken down into how each age cohort voted, from 1984- 2004, in order to recognize any age, period, and cohort effects in voting patterns. For example, voters who had their impressionable years during the Reagan Administration might be expected to consistently vote more conservatively compared to others, and so this would be a cohort effect. Strength of preference for those who voted will also be

analyzed, and if the *impressionable years model* is correct, the older people get the stronger their preferences will be. After the Presidential elections from 1984 through 2004 are analyzed, Party ID will also be looked at to ascertain any period, age and cohort effects. In addition, it will be useful to see if the party system is being rejected by the young which will be the case if the number of independents is going up. Although if more independents are found among the young, it may be generational effects as opposed to cohort effects since it is possible the young have just not found where they "fit" in the political party system yet. To help in figuring out if the young are rejecting the party system, strength of partisanship will be examined also, again with the expectation that partisanship strengthens as people get older if the *impressionable years model* is correct. Next, opinions on abortion rights will be examined to see if the cohorts themselves change their opinions on the issue through time, as well as to observe any differences among the cohorts. Then, political knowledge and voter turnout will be analyzed, as well as the interest people have in public affairs. Presumably, an 18 year old who might still live with their parents would show a different level of interest compared to the middle aged who have a vested interest in how much their salary is taxed. For political knowledge, respondents were asked to answer basic questions that are typical for studies like this one. This measure is useful to see how many people are misguided with their political views. To be sure age is the only factor in the analysis, education will be controlled for when analyzing levels of political knowledge and interest in public affairs, since it would not be a surprise education rather than age is what decides how closely someone follows politics or how much somebody knows. Opinions on homosexuals serving in the military will also be inspected also.

Opinions on affirmative action will then be observed, and the findings should yield interesting results since it is a hot button issue and has been challenged in the Supreme Court several times in the past decade. Opinions on what respondents think the most important national problem is and their opinion on the standing of the United States provides an opportunity to test whether the young are more affected by events compared with the middle aged and elderly, since according to the *impressionable years model* this is the case. This can be done by observing opinions on the standing of the U.S. before and after 9/11, and then by comparing the changes in opinions (if there are any) that the young had with those that the older had. If those in their impressionable years had a larger change in opinion compared to those who are older, it would seem that the young are more influenced by events and what is going on in the world, while the middle aged have their opinions so crystallized there is little room for change even in the face of a major event. If the data does not show this, the *impressionable years model* would be incorrect in at least some instances. Further, if an opinion changes drastically it could just illustrate how some issues are salient while others are not. This could potentially help explain why Party ID is traditionally stable; it is important to people, so they pay attention to it. It is also important to point out the argument against saliency and opinion stability, and that is if large fluctuations are seen it may be because these opinions are actually *nonattitudes* (Erikson and Tedin 32). This means that if large changes are seen in opinions without any major events that could have caused these changes in opinion, then the opinions are useless. So, if an opinion changes dramatically for no clear reason, a possible explanation could be that people do not hold meaningful opinions.

While the above questions focus on what people think, the next inquiries will focus on how different age cohorts get their political information. If there are clear differences in opinion

among the age cohorts, perhaps different sources of political information could help account for some differences in opinions about the issues. Determining how people get their news will be done by comparing how often the different age cohorts read newspapers. The same will be done for news programs on television as well the Internet. With the relatively young age of mass access to the Internet, how the different age cohorts respond should be revealing about exactly who is utilizing the new technology and who relies on what other methods to get political information.

The problems of a cohort analysis like this are well documented. The complication in analyzing age, period, and cohort simultaneously is known as the *identification problem* (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 6). This problem ensues because there are three independent variables and they are all linear functions of each other. This makes it statistically impossible to separate age, period, and cohort. Essentially this means that when a change is observed over a certain period of time, there is no technique to interpret if the change is due to age effects, period effects, or cohort effects. In many instances, age effects, cohort effects, and period effects are all at work when change is observed. However, lack of precise explanations does not mean that acceptable and correct explanations cannot be deduced. During a cohort analysis, then, it is the job of the researcher to make correct inferences. This is done by taking *side information* and using it to aid in figuring out which effect(s) causes change (Glenn, Cohort Analysis 7). Further, in many instances simply using common sense can make reasonable judgments Glenn, Cohort Analysis 22). Also, different theories as well as knowledge of the times can help in reaching reasonable judgments. In short, separating age effects, period effects, and cohort effects is statistically impossible. While being cautious to not make faulty judgments, it is the job of the researcher to

figure out the logic puzzle of sorts that the combination of age effects, period effects, and cohort effects presents in a cohort analysis like this one.

In conclusion, the *impressionable years model* will be tested in this analysis while the *life-long opens model*, the *generational model* and the *life-cycle model* will act as alternatives when the *impressionable years model* does not fit. The nature of the analysis will be an aggregate *repeated cross sectional*. The analysis will start off by observing voting trends in the Presidential Elections from 1984-2004 broken down by age cohort. Next, Party ID will be observed. In addition, opinions on abortion will also be observed for any changes in opinion throughout time as the cohorts age. Voter turnout and political knowledge will also be analyzed. In many cases, education will be controlled for as to not confuse educational effects with age effects. Opinions on the standing of the United States will also be analyzed before and after 9/11 to see if events really do matter in changing opinions, with particular attention paid to the difference in the change of opinions among adults and the change of opinions among those in their impressionable years; the same will be done when analyzing the most important national problem during the end of the Cold War. This will gauge if the young are more responsive to the political environment. Affirmative action will also be inspected. Where age cohorts get their news will also be ascertained, as different sources of news could explain some differences in opinion among the cohorts. The problems of an analysis like this are well documented, and the researcher will take a conservative approach when untangling age, period, and cohort effects while drawing conclusions.

PRESIDENTIAL VOTE CHOICE AND PARTISANSHIP

Presidential Vote Choice

How Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 voted throughout the 1984-2004 years provides some interesting observations. Cohort 1 voted 56.3% Republican during Reagan's reelection in 1984 and 50.6% Republican for Bush in 1988, while cohort 2 voted 51.8% for Bush. Then, when Bush ran for reelection in 1992 the Cohort 1 Republican vote dropped 10.5% to 40.1% while the Cohort 2 Republican vote dropped 21.7% to 30.1%. Both cohorts had their impressionable years during Republican administrations and should be expected to stay loyal to Republicans according to the *impressionable years model*, but as Erikson and Tedin point out, "Bush started his administration riding high from the end of the cold war, and then the successful Gulf War. Only as his term ended did Bush's approval approximate the low numbers predicted by hard economic times" (Erikson and Tedin 109). It seems Bush lost votes because his foreign policy skills were no longer valued as highly since the Cold War was coming to a close. It is also important to note that Erikson and Tedin say, "It is common knowledge that the president's approval rating rises and falls with the state of the economy" (Erikson and Tedin 107). Put another way, Bush was in trouble when the economic hard times started. This is confirmed when analyzing what people thought the number one national problem was. In 1984, 31.2% of Cohort 1 thought economics was the biggest national problem while 39% thought foreign affairs was the most important national problem. In 1988, economics jumped to 40.1% for cohort 1 while foreign affairs dropped to 14.5%, and in 1992 economics went all the way up to 46.7% and foreign affairs plummeted all the way down to 3.3%. For Cohort 2, economics went from 33.2% in 1988 to 41.4% in 1992, while foreign policy dramatically fell from 11.9% to 1.7% during the same

period. These statistics point to period effects since they crossed all the cohorts; the public felt that the foreign policy skills of Bush were not needed as much, and Bush took all the blame for the declining economy. This is supported by Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde who say, "The very low levels of expressed concern about international problems undoubtedly reflects the ending of the cold war…" (173).

Further evidence of how strong this period effect was is the 38.7% of Cohort 3 who said the economy was the most important national issue in 1992. As the youngest cohort, they would presumably have the least amount of interest in the economy since they are not as established in the work force as the older cohorts. Indeed, the 38.7% is telling because out of the youngest cohorts in every year from 1984-2004, this is the highest percent that said the economy was the most important national issue. So, the data and outside information show that strong period effects were at work in the 1992 election. When the *impressionable years model* is applied, the validity of it depends on how one interprets the data. On the one hand, Cohort 1 voted 56.3% in 1984 and 50.6% in 1988 before dropping to only 40.1% in 1992 when Clinton rose to the Presidency, roughly 16% less than in 1984. However, in both 1992 and 1996, Cohort 1, who had their impressionable years during the Reagan Administration, voted at least 10% more Republican than Cohort 2 and Cohort 3. Since Cohort 1 is older than Cohort 2 and Cohort 3, the more crystallized views of Cohort 1 are expected according to the *impressionable years model*. The data therefore most strongly support the *impressionable years model* since those who had their impressionable years during the Reagan Administration were more reliably Republican than anybody else.

Explaining the other cohorts is not as simple as the explanation for Cohort 1. For example, Cohort 2 voted 51.8% Republican in 1988, but then voted only 30.1% and 35.5% Republican in 1992 and 1996, respectively. One important factor in both of these races was the entry of Ross Perot who was not a factor in the election of 1988. As Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde say, "There is considerable evidence that the Perot vote would have split evenly between Clinton and Bush in 1992. Of course, some Perot voters would not have voted at all if he had not been on the ballot…" (77). If we split the percent vote for Perot evenly between Bush and Clinton, Cohort 2 would have voted 54.9% for the Democrat candidate and 45.1% for the Republican candidate. These numbers are more comparable to those for Cohort 1. When Perot is out of the picture in the 2000 election, Cohort 2 votes 50% for the Republican candidate. It is not surprising that Cohort 2 voted more for Perot than Cohort 1; Cohort 2 was younger and their opinions were more elastic, whereas Cohort 1 was older and had more time for their opinions to solidify. The impact Perot had on the way the cohorts voted is best described as both an age effect and a period effect. The data show that every age cohort voted substantially more for independent candidates when Perot was running than when he was not, and this shows the period effect. The fact that the young were more influenced by Perot in the race shows how the voting results also show evidence of an age effect. In short, the elections in the 1984-2000 years support a loose version of the *impressionable years model*. That is, the cohorts examined voted the way they were "supposed" to vote when there were no special circumstances, but caution is needed as to not under estimate extreme, unusual effects as the entrance of Perot in the elections of 1992 and 1996 illustrated in the data. The *generational model* may seem more appropriate at first, but it posits change in opinion that is permanent, whereas Perot increasing the vote for 3rd party

candidates was temporary. Therefore, out of the models used to describe political behavior, a loose version of the *impressionable years model* is the best fit for what the data are describing.

Strength of Presidential Vote Choice

When the strength of preference is examined for those who voted for President no clear patterns emerge. Observing Cohort 1 gives a good example of the lack of patterns. When answering this question, respondents answered either "strong" or "not strong". In 1984, Cohort 1 answered 80.2% strong, 71.9% strong in 1988, 78.7% strong in 1992, 69.4% strong in 1996 and 66.4% strong in 2000. In 1988, Cohort 2 answered strong 74.5% of the time in 1988, 81.4% in 1992, 65.6% in 1996, 75.5% in 2000 and 85.5% in 2004. Cohort 3 goes from 82.2% strong in 1992, to 71.4% in 1996 and 81.3% in 2000. Cohort 4, the youngest Cohort in 1996, had 81.2% who voted strongly. This data certainly does not fit the *impressionable years model* since the youngest cohort often is voting with a stronger preference than the older cohorts.

As we have seen, the percent of people from each cohort feeling a strong preference for the candidate they voted for follows no specific pattern. For example, in 1996 Cohort 4 was the youngest cohort and voted strongly 81.2% of the time, but Cohort 1 voted strongly only 69.4% of the time. The *impressionable years model* would tell us that Cohort 1 would have voted stronger since their views would have been more crystallized. Additionally, Cohort 1 only increased their strength of preference for the Presidential vote once, and it was by a little over 7% after they had dropped more than that in a previous Presidential election. Rather than disproving the *impressionable years model*, this data is more illustrative of the strength and importance of short-term factors. Flanigan and Zingale hold that there are certain short-term forces so strong, such as the personal attributes of candidates, they can make or break a candidate

(Flanigan and Zingale 171). While strength of preference is determined in large part by short-term forces that do not reveal much about long-term political socialization, the percent of strong partisans in each cohort throughout the years tells much more about long-term political socialization.

Strong Partisans

Strong partisans is a strong and reliable measure to see how the cohorts are (or are not) becoming more partisan throughout the years because there is no doubt as to what a strong partisan is, as opposed to trying to figure out what the differences between a "leaning independent" and a "independent" are. With this is mind, strong partisans certainly follow the pattern the *impressionable years model* say it would both within each cohort as well as among the cohorts.

Each cohort in this study shows an upward trend in the percent of people who classify themselves as a strong partisan, although of course the patterns are not perfect and there are several exceptions. But generally the data fit the *impressionable years model* and this should be expected as Campbell et al. showed in the American Voter (161). Although the data in their study is from the 1950's, the similarities between what they found in their data and the findings in this study reveal just how strong partisanship is as well as how long it has been potent as the data in this study are from the 1980's, 1990's and early 2000's.

Cohort 1 was 17.1% "Strong Partisan" in 1984 to 27% in 1988, 21.4% in 1992, 30% in 1996 and 30.9% in 2000. Clearly there is an upward trend, although it is imperfect. Cohort 2 follows a similar pattern as Cohort 1. In 1988 Cohort 2 was 21.2% "Strong Partisan", 19.5% in 1992, 26.3% in 1996, 31% in 2000 and 31.5% in 2004. Again, a clear upward trend is seen and

continues among the other cohorts. Cohort 3 was 15.9% "Strong Partisan" in 1992, 25.4% in 1996 and 24.6% in 2000. Cohort 4 was 20.8% "Strong Partisan" in 1996, 24.8% in 2000 and 24.3% in 2004. Cohort 4 does not fit the *impressionable years model* as well as Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 do, but with only three years of data it would be premature to call it an anomaly. Cohort 5 is 16.5% "Strong Partisan" in 2000 and 34.9% in 2004. To be sure, the general upward trend each cohort has fits the *impressionable years model* very well as the older people are, the stronger their partisanship is. As Campbell et al. put it in The American Voter, "Older people have had more time to accumulate tenure in their party association, even those who in their earlier years moved from one party to the other" (65). Indeed, this is supported when the cohorts are compared with one another throughout the years. For example, in 1992 Cohort 1 was 21.4% "Strong Partisan" while Cohort 2 was 19.5% "Strong Partisan" and Cohort 3 was 15.9%. Indeed, the older feel more established to their parties than the young do. This pattern is seen again in 1996 as Cohort 1 was 30% "Strong Partisan", Cohort 2 had 26.3% in the same category while Cohort 3 and 4 had 25.4% and 20.8%, respectively. The pattern continues in 2000 where Cohort 1 had 30.9% "Strong Partisan", Cohort 2, Cohort 3, Cohort 4 and Cohort 5 had 31%, 24.6%, 24.8% and 16.5% labeled as "Strong Partisan", respectively. So as we have seen, the data in this study most certainly support the *impressionable years model* as far as Party ID is concerned since is supports a general pattern of stronger partisan for the older, and weaker partisanship for the younger.

Self-Described Ideology

In addition to the patterns observed in the data on Strength of Partisanship, a clear pattern emerges on the data on partisanship in which as the cohorts aged they tended to identify more

with a conservative ideology than with a moderate or liberal ideology. For example, take Cohort 1. In 1984 Cohort 1 was 36.6% Conservative, 50% in 1988, 52.8% in 1992, 54.2% in 1996, and 67.8% in 2000. Although Cohort 1 is showing age effects consistent with all cohorts it is important to keep in mind the impressionable years for this cohort were during the Reagan Administration, and thus age effects are intermingled with cohort effects. As we will see, the data on the other cohorts eliminates the possibility of having solely a cohort effect responsible for Cohort 1 becoming more conservative as it ages, since all the cohorts become more conservative as they age.

Cohort 2 was 43% Conservative in 1988, 49.4% in 1992, 49.4% in 1996, 64.7% in 2000 and 62.7% in 2004. Cohort 3, which was 43.9% Conservative in 1992, was 56.9% Conservative in 2000. Cohort 4 was 42.2% Conservative in 1996 and 55.8% Conservative in 2004, and Cohort 5 went from 30% Conservative in 2000 to 41.9% in 2004. Clearly there is a pattern of more conservatism as the cohorts age and this can be due to many reasons. Campbell et al. say that while it is impossible to say why people become more conservative as they age perhaps the fact that, "…in general the Republican Party has an air of respectability, conservatism, and social status which the Democratic Party does not fully share. If we assume that these values have an increasing appeal to older people we have the essential conditions for the creation of an age dimension in political partisanship" (165-166). It is important to point out that not everybody agrees on what the data are actually showing. Glenn says that, "Paradoxically, people may become more likely to consider themselves conservative and to be considered conservative by others while, according to a constant definition of conservatism, they become less conservative" (Glenn, Aging and Conservatism 185). In other words Glenn thinks that people may think they

are becoming more conservative, but they really are not. Indeed, Glenn makes a strong statement when he says, "Although the evidence suggests that attitudes probably become somewhat less susceptible to change as people grow older, there is scant evidence for any other contribution of aging to conservatism" (Glenn, Aging and Conservatism 176). Glenn also adds that, "Whereas aging cohorts have changed in the same direction as the total adult population, those aging beyond young adulthood have generally changed less than the total population. Perhaps this increase in the relative conservatism of aging persons explains why one study shows an increase in conservative self identifications in aging cohorts, but not in the total population" (Glenn, Aging and Conservatism 185). So then, it would seem without further information there is no consensus on what the data are showing, besides the fact that people at least think they are more conservative as they get older.

In order to tell if people are really becoming more conservative specific issue positions need to be observed. In other words, do the cohorts, as they self-classify as more conservative, also have the "appropriate" opinions to match their conservative position? For example, does Cohort 1, who was 67.8% conservative in 2000, have a similar percent of people who hold conservative opinions on abortion in 2000? If not, does this mean that as people get older, ideology tends to correlate less with specific issue positions? Is ideology a better indicator of issue positions for the young? There is no doubt that the data shows a clear trend of people classifying themselves as more conservative as they get older, and a look at specific issue positions will help decipher if people really are getting more conservative or if ideology is really not indicative of issue positions.

OPINIONS ON ABORTION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND GAY RIGHTS

Opinions on Abortion

When opinions on when abortion should be allowed are observed for Cohort 1, the results are the opposite of what they "should" be for a cohort who is classifying themselves as increasingly conservative. In 1984, 37.9% of Cohort 1 said a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion (e.g. not only in extreme circumstances such as rape or incest). In 1988 this number goes up to 44.6% and in 1992 it rises again to 48.9%. In 1996 the percent of people in Cohort 1 who think a woman should always be allowed to get an abortion under the law is 51.3%, and then it 2000 the percent stays stable at 51.5%. These are not the kind of issue positions on abortion a cohort "should" have if they are classifying themselves as more and more conservative as they age. When ideology is controlled for, and only people who classify themselves as conservatives are observed, 29.1% say abortion should always be allowed by law in 1984, 34.7% say abortion should always be allowed in 1988, the percent jumps to 38.1% in 1992, dips to 33.7% in 1996, and rises again to 37.5% in 2000. This is an interesting find since it shows that even among conservatives, Cohort 1 generally favors legal abortion more as they age.

Cohort 2 displays similar patterns to Cohort 1, although the upward trend is not as strong. In 1988, 38.6% of Cohort 2 thought that abortion should always be legal, in 1992 this percent jumped to 50.4%, in 1996 it dipped to 49%, declined to 47.9% in 2000 and again in 2004 at 44%. When only conservatives are looked at, 35% say abortion should always be legal in 1988, 45.2% say abortion should always be legal in 1992, the number dips to 40.8% in 1996, stays about the same at 41.5% in 2000 and then has a significant drop to 31.9% in 2004.

Cohort 3 stays about the same in the 3 years it is in the data, having 51% saying abortion should always be legal in 1992, 50.4% in 1996 and 48.6% in 2000. When ideology is controlled for and only conservatives are observed in 1992, 1996 and 2000 41.2%, 32.7% and 43.9% think abortion should always be legal in those years, respectively. Cohort 4, before ideology is controlled for, has 40.1% saying abortion should always be legal in 1996, 40.7% in 2000 and 43.1% in 2004. When conservatives are the only people looked at these numbers in 1996, 2000 and 2004 are 30.6%, 23.8% and 34.2%, respectively. Cohort 5 had 41% say abortion should always be legal in 2000 and 49.3% say the same in 2004, before the control of ideology. When ideology is controlled for in 2000 and 2004 these numbers for conservatives are 37% and 40%, respectively.

The data describing opinions on the legality of abortion and ideology allow for some conclusions on the predictive power ideology has for opinions on abortion. For Cohort 1 the data illustrate that ideology is a poor predictor for opinions on abortion. As stated earlier, Cohort 1 went from 36% self-identifying as conservative in 1984 to 67.8% in 2000. During the same interval, from 1984 to 2000, Cohort 1 went from 37.9% thinking abortion should always be legal to 51.5% thinking abortion should always be legal. Cohort 2 shows a similar pattern of having increasing conservatism, going from 43% in 1988 to 62.7% in 2004, and yet they are also become more permissive on the legality of abortion as the percent who say abortion should always be legal in 1988 is 38.6% and then this number goes up to 44% in 2004. Clearly the data show that Cohort 2 is following the same pattern as Cohort 1; despite growing conservatism, Cohort 2 is more permissive of abortion.

Cohort 3 was 43.9% conservative in 1992 and 56.9% in 2000, and during this same time Cohort 3 went from 51% thinking abortion should always be legal to 48.6% thinking abortion should always be legal. Although this data is more of a fit of what a cohort who is getting more conservative "should" think, there is also only 8 years of data here, whereas Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 have 16 years of data. This certainly does not discredit the data on Cohort 3, but having half the amount of data as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 is something that needs to be kept in mind.

For abortion, then, it is safe to conclude that as people age, the weaker their ideology is as a predictor for the issue. In other words, for issue positions on abortion the younger the cohort is, the better predictor ideology will be. Does this mean the same is true for all issues as people age, that is, does ideology become a weaker predictor for issue positions the older people get, or is abortion a unique issue that does not line up with ideology? Perhaps social issues are not what make older people conservative, and maybe as people age they identify more with conservatism because of economic reasons. Only a further analysis of more issues will be able to answer this question. An interesting study, done by Mitchell Killian and Clyde Wilcox, may shed some light on the answer to this question. They said that while change of party can certainly occur for people who have strong opinions on abortion, they also found that, "…our results show that even the most pro-life democrats or pro-choice republicans are much more likely to remain with their current party than there are to defect to the opposing party" (Killian and Wilcox 571). Perhaps abortion is just not what people are thinking of when they define their ideology. With this in mind, looking at other issues besides abortion will be telling if abortion is unique in it not being able to be predicted by ideology as people age.

Opinions on Affirmative Action

No matter what the question is, the way people are asked things can have a large impact on the answers questions that are asked. Questions on affirmative action are a good example of this, as the way questions on affirmative action are asked cause great fluctuation in the answers given by respondents in surveys. As Clawson and Oxley put it, "As with other civil rights policies, whites and blacks support affirmative action in principle more than they do in practice" (Clawson and Oxley 260). People support the concept of helping out historically disadvantaged groups such as African Americans but, "Citizens' support for affirmative action falls dramatically when the policies refer to specific steps to ensure the equal treatment of blacks" (Clawson and Oxley 260). This distinction in the way questions are posited means the manner the question was asked in the American National Election Study is important. The question asked by the cumulative data file used for this study is the following: "Some people say that because of past discrimination blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion-- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?" (American National Election Study 2004 Cumulative Data File). The way this question is worded obviously falls into to specific steps in helping African Americans, not a general principle. The framework of the question asked is important to keep in mind as the data on the cohorts in observed.

In 1992, 19.9% of Cohort 1 said they were "For" preferential hiring and promotion for blacks. In 1996, this number drops to 13.5% and in 2000 the number drops again to 11.8%. In the course of 8 years, the percent of people in Cohort 1 who support affirmative action for

African Americans was cut in half, roughly. In 1992 Cohort 2 answered 20.2% "For" preferential hiring and promotion for blacks. In 1996 this number dropped to 14.6%, in 2000 this number was 10.5% and in 2004 this number rose to 17.6%. Although Cohort 2 had a jump in the percent of people who supported affirmative action, the cohort still follows a general downward trend in the percent of people who support affirmative action. Cohort 3 went from 23.3% "For" affirmative action in 1992, and this number dropped in 1996 to 14.3% before dropping again to 12.9% in 2000. Cohort 4 was 18.6% "For" affirmative action in 1996 and this number dipped to 10% in 2000 before rising slightly to 14.5% in 2004. All the cohorts, as they age, have a general downward trend in their support for affirmative action. This means that as the cohorts are getting more conservative, their opinions on affirmative action match up with their growing conservatism.

The data described above about opinions on affirmative action support the idea that ideology is a good predictor of the issue positions people have on affirmative action, in contrast to opinions on abortion. That is, as people become more conservative their opinions on affirmative action generally follow the conservative trend as well. Additionally, life cycle effects seem to be present in the data because as people age they tend to be against affirmative action. Perhaps once people are more established in the work force they do not want any advantage to be given to the people they are competing with. So far, then, we have seen that abortion and affirmative action have opposite relationships with ideology as far as predictive power goes; ideology is a very good predictor for both the old and the young for opinions on affirmative action, but ideology is only a good predictor for the young on abortion opinions. Something of relevance here are the ideas of Hetherington who says that, "Decreasing trust in government over

the last two generations has undermined public support for federal programs like welfare, food stamps, and foreign aid, not to mention the entire range of race-targeted programs to make equality between the races a reality" (Hetherington 139). Hetherington says that declining trust in the government causes people to support social welfare programs less. Hetherington also says that, "…it seems that declining political trust helps explain what many have erroneously referred to as a conservative turn in American politics" (Hetherington 61). So, perhaps people are not becoming more conservative about affirmative action because of age and maybe they appear more conservative because of distrust in government. However, for the purposes of this paper, the most important issue is that ideology is a good predictor of issue positions on affirmative action, even as people age.

Opinions on Gay Rights

Gay rights is another issue that can be observed to see if issues positions match up with the apparent growing conservatism in the cohorts as the cohorts age. If the cohorts really are becoming more conservative on issue positions then they should not favor homosexuals serving in the military. When Cohort 1 was asked in 1992 if they thought gays should be able to serve in the military, 61.2% supported having gays serve in the military. In 1996, this number went up to 70.2% and in 2000 this number went up slightly to 73.7%. Cohort 1, who had more people every year classifying themselves as conservative, does not have their opinions on gay rights match up to their self-identifying conservatism.

Cohort 2 had 59.9% say that they thought gays should be able to serve in the military in 1992. This number goes up to 67.4% in 1996, 75.6% in 2000 and 79.7% in 2004. There is a clear trend here; Cohort 2 increasingly thinks that gays should be able to serve in the military. Cohort

3 shows a similar trend, as in 1992 Cohort 3 has 56.1% thinking that homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the military. In 1996 this number jumps to 79.2% and stays steady at 69.6% in 2000.

In 1996, the first year Cohort 4 is in the data, Cohort 4 has 70.8% saying homosexuals should be able to serve in the military. In 2000 this number goes up to 73.5%, and the number goes up again to 86.7% in 2004. Cohort 5, who starts at 85.9% thinking homosexuals should be able to serve in the military in 2000, the first year it is in the data, drops slightly to 83.8% in 2004. Clearly then all the cohorts become more accepting as they get older of homosexuals serving in the military.

The growing support for homosexuals to serve in the military is clear and substantial. While this support for homosexuals may not have been seen a few decades ago, Clawson and Oxley say that, "There has been a sea change in attitudes toward employment rights for gays and lesbians over the last three decades" and that, "Citizens demonstrate strong support for equal job opportunities for gays and lesbians" (Clawson and Oxley 274). In other words, there has been a period effect on all the cohorts that is pushing them towards supporting employment rights for the homosexual community. Brewer agrees and says that in the 1990's, "One of the fundamental predispositions that shaped opinion in [gay rights], feelings towards gays and lesbians underwent shifts that produced greater support for gay rights policies" (Brewer 217). The data certainly support Brewer as well as Clawson and Oxley in that there has been strong, clear period effects influencing opinions about gay rights. These period effects were so strong and pronounced that they influenced all the cohorts roughly the same in the direction towards supporting homosexuals in the military. Most importantly, for this purpose of this paper, is the fact that the increasing

conservatism among all of the cohorts is not matched in conservative opinions about homosexuals in any sense. Indeed, it seems as though the cohort's ideology contradicts with their issue positions on homosexuals.

SOMERS' D FOR ABORTION, GAY RIGHTS, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Somers' D for Abortion

When Somers'd is observed for the above issues, all of which are social issues, some clear patterns emerge. When Somers' D was calculated the independent variable was whatever issue position was being observed while the dependent variable was the 3 category liberal-conservative scale used earlier in this paper, while the cohort syntax described earlier in this paper and the year acted as controls. For abortion, Cohort 1 has a Somers' D of .205 in 1984. In 1988 this numbers dips to .158 before rising to .238 in 1992. In 1996, the Somers' D for abortion was .339% and in 2000 this number is .283. Cohort 1 has a clear upward trend in their Somers' D for abortion, and this means that the individuals who make up Cohort 1 increasingly associate their issue positions on abortion with their ideology. When the data on Cohort 2 is observed, their Somers' D was .119 in 1988. In 1992 it was .184 and in 1996 this number was .237. In 2000 and 2004 the Somers' D was .221 and .242, respectively. For Cohort 3, the Somers' D was .236 in 1992, .315 in 1996 and .239 in 2000. The data on Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 provide some interesting observations. First, Cohort 1 maintains a higher Somers' D than Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 do for abortion throughout the data, and the relationship between ideology and issue positions on abortion is weaker for the younger cohorts since the younger cohorts enter with a weaker relationship and the relationship stays weaker. The younger cohorts coming into the data after Cohort 1 place less emphasis on their issue positions on abortion when describing their ideology, then. Another clear pattern in the data is the general upward trend in Somers' D for all three cohorts, meaning that as the cohorts age, abortion increases in saliency across the board for Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3. Also present in the data is a clear period effect in

1996 when all Cohorts had an increase in the saliency of their abortion opinions, and this was also followed by a clear, slight drop off in saliency in 2000. All of the trends just described are illustrated well in Figure 1.



	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004
Cohort 1	0.205	0.158	0.238	0.339	0.283	
Cohort 2		0.119	0.184	0.237	0.221	0.242
Cohort 3			0.236	0.315	0.239	

Figure 1 Somers' D for Abortion Opinions

Although not on the graph, it is also worth mentioning what Cohort 4 and Cohort 5 had for their Somers' D on for abortion. In 1996, Cohort 4 has a Somers' D of .230, in 2000 it was .352 and in 2004 it was .204. For Cohort 5, the Somers' D was .045, in 2000, and in 2004 this number shoots up to .290. In short, Somers' D on abortion opinions has shown that, in general, as people age there is more of a connection between ideology and opinions on abortion. The data also showed that younger cohorts put less emphasis on abortion opinions when forming their ideology, although they still follow the general trend of abortion being more important as they age.

Somers' D for Gay Rights

When Somers' D is observed on opinions on gays serving in the military an opposite trend from what was observed for opinions on abortion is observed. That is, instead of opinions on gays serving in the military increasing in saliency, they decrease in saliency. However, like abortion, Somers' D for opinions on gays serving in the military remains the most salient for Cohort 1 and is not as salient for the younger cohorts. Somers' D for Cohort 1 was .294 in 1992, .252 in 1996 and .232 in 2000. For Cohort 2 in 1992 Somers' D was .098, in 1996 it was .169, in 2000 was .130 and in 2004 was .263. For Cohort 3 in 1992 Somers' D was .220. In 1996 this number was .159 and in 2000 this number was .113. Figure 2 helps to graphically illustrate what the data are showing, which is the saliency of gays serving in the military for Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 is generally dropping. And although the saliency is generally dropping, the issue of gays serving in the military is always more salient for them, similar to how abortion was always more salient for Cohort 1. Cohort 4, who is not in the graph, had a Somers' D of .196 in 1996, .223 in 2000 and .102 in 2004. Cohort 5, who is also not in the graph, had a Somers' D of .357 in 2000 and .377 in 2004.



Figure 2 Somers' D for Gay Rights Opinions

Somers' D for Affirmative Action

When Somers' D is observed for affirmative action for Cohort 1 in 1992 it is .100. In 1996 this number rises to .165, and in 2000 the number drops down to .07. For Cohort 2 the Somers' D was .019 in 1992, .055 in 1996, .009 in 2000 and .067 in 2004. For Cohort 3, the Somers' D was .019 in 1992, .004 in 1996 and .121 in 2000. The data on Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 reveal some clear patterns. First, there is a period effect in 1996 where Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 increase the saliency of affirmative action before having it drop. This is similar to the temporary increase in saliency of opinions on abortion that was observed in the 1996 data on Somers' D for abortion. Also, generally speaking, the issue of affirmative action is more salient for Cohort 1 than it is for any other Cohort, as were the issues of gays serving in the military and abortion. All of the issues observed so far have been social issues, and perhaps the

impressionable years of Cohort 1 caused Cohort 1 to have high salience on social issues. When economic issues are examined the opinions and Somers' D statistic for these issues will be telling on how salient economic issues are for Cohort 1 compared to how salient social issues are. Also telling of affirmative action is how not salient it is for the cohorts compared to abortion and gays in the military. The Somers' D statistic for opinions on abortion and gays in the military never dropped below .100 for Cohort 1, Cohort 2 and Cohort 3, whereas affirmative action has Somers' D statistics below .01. In other words, affirmative action is just not very salient. Figure 3 provides a graphic illustration of all of the aforementioned patterns. Cohort 4, who is not in the graph, had a Somers' D of .212 in 1996, .084 in 2000 and .161 in 2004. Cohort 5 had a Somers' D of .08 in 2000 and .204 in 2004.



Figure 3 Somers' D for Affirmative Action Opinions

OPINIONS ON FEDERAL WELFARE SPENDING AND FOOD STAMPS

Opinions on Welfare

Examining opinions on welfare spending show some clear period effects from 1992 to 1996 and 2000. 18% of Cohort 1 thought that welfare spending should increase in 1992. The percent of respondents in Cohort 1 who thought that more should be spent on welfare decreased by more than half to 8.9% in 1996. Cohort 2 shows a similar pattern. In 1992, 19% of Cohort 2 thought that welfare spending should be increased. In 1996 this number dropped to 12% before rising again to 17.8% in 2000. Cohort 3, showing patterns as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2, had 21.8% say that welfare spending should be increased by the federal government in 1992. In 1996 this number dropped to 12.8% before rising to 19.4% in 2000. Cohort 1 and Cohort 3 are no longer in the data in 2004, but Cohort 2 had 25% say they think federal spending on welfare should be increased. The data are showing a very clear period effect here; a smaller percentage of all the cohorts thought that federal spending on welfare programs should increase when 1992 is compared to 1996, but from 1996 to 2000 all the cohorts thought more should be spent. So, the data convey a very clear, consistent period effect. This phenomenon, where people think spending should be increased on a certain issue after spending is cut or perceived as too low, is seen with many other issues. For example, Erikson and Tedin describe how people thought that defense spending should be increased during the Carter Administration (Erikson and Tedin 93). So, when people see spending is too low on a certain issue, oftentimes public opinion will shift towards in increase on spending for that issue until spending is increased. Indeed, once defense spending was increased, the amount of people thinking there should be an increase in defense spending fell dramatically. In short, people wanted increased defense spending and they got it,

and then less people thought there should be an increase in defense spending. For welfare, people thought there should be less spent and they got the cut, and then less people thought it should be cut. This makes it difficult to determine if opinions on welfare are becoming more conservative since they seem to be so dependent on short-term factors.

Opinions on Food Stamps

In 1984, 25.2% of Cohort 1 thought that federal spending on food stamps should be increased. In 1988 this number drops to 23.9%. In 1992 and 1996 the percent of Cohort 1 who thought that federal spending on food stamps was 17.6% and 11.1%, respectively. In 2000, 15.6% of Cohort 1 thought that federal spending on food stamps should increase, and this slight increase from 1996 represents the only increase in the percent of respondents from Cohort 1 who thought that more should be spent on food stamps. Overall, there is a strong downward trend in support of federal spending on food stamps in Cohort 1.

In 1988, 24.7% of Cohort 2 thought that the federal government should spend more on food stamps. In 1992 this number drops to 14.8%, and this is followed by another drop to 13.3% in 1996. In 2000 the percent of people in Cohort 2 who think that federal spending on food stamps drops again to 12.1%. Cohort 2 experienced the same trend Cohort 1 did, and that is a steady drop in support for increased federal spending on food stamps. So, opinions on food stamps become more conservative as for Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 as they age.

The pattern Cohort 3 shows in their support for federal spending on food stamps is distinctive from Cohort 1 and Cohort 2. In 1992, 19.6% of Cohort 3 thought that federal spending on food stamps should be increased. In 1996 this number dropped sharply to 8.5%. So far this pattern is in line with the pattern Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 follow. However, in 2000 the

number of people in Cohort 3 who think federal spending of food stamps should increase almost triples to 23%. This jump is obviously substantial, although seeing if this is a permanent jump or merely a temporary quirk is not possible since the data ends in 2000 for this particular variable. What is possible though is to see how salient this issue is for Cohort 3 when they are forming their ideology when Somers' D is observed for this issue.

SOMERS' D FOR WELFARE AND FOOD STAMPS

Somers' D for Welfare

When Somers' D was calculated the independent variable was whatever issue position was being observed while the dependent variable was the 3 category liberal-conservative scale used earlier in this paper, while the cohort syntax described earlier in this paper and the year acted as control. The Somers' D for welfare for Cohort 1 in 1992 was .163. In 1996 the Somers' D for welfare for Cohort 1 rose to .193, and in 2000 this number increased to .203. So as Cohort 1 aged throughout the years, the relationship between welfare opinions for those in Cohort 1 and their ideology is increasing.

Cohort 2 had a Somers' D of .03 in 1992. However, in 1996 the Somers' D jumps significantly to .227, and this is followed by another jump to .266 in 2000. This is significant because when Somers' D was observed for social issues earlier in this paper Cohort 2 did not come close to Cohort 1. So, this data help show what Cohort 2 is thinking about when they label themselves as a certain ideology, and this data shows that Cohort 2 is thinking more about economic issues as they age.

Cohort 3 had a Somers' D of .047 in 1992. While Cohort 2 also had a low Somers' D in 1992 followed by a large jump in 1996, Cohort 3 has no large jump in 1996 as their Somers' D is .061 in 1996. A drop follows this to .032 in 2000. This data clearly show that Cohort 3 is not thinking of federal spending on welfare when they are thinking of their ideology. As a whole, the data show some strong generation effects, as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 have a strong connection between their self-described ideology and welfare spending opinions while Cohort 3 has a very weak connection between their welfare spending opinions and their ideology. It is important to

note that age effects are probably intermingled with generational effects since Cohort 3 is younger than Cohort 1 and Cohort 2. However, these effects are minimal at best and certainly do not explain why Cohort has such a low Somers' D for welfare spending. All of the above data are displayed in Figure 4.



	1992	1996	2000
Cohort 1	0.163	0.193	0.203
Cohort 2	0.03	0.227	0.266
Cohort 3	0.047	0.061	0.032

Figure 4 Somers' D for Federal Welfare Spending Opinions

Somers' D for Food Stamps

When examining opinions of food stamp spending, in 1988 Cohort 1 had a Somers' D of .067. This increased in 1992 and 1996 to .124 and .213, respectively. In 2000 this number dropped slightly to .101. Cohort 2 had a Somers' D of .009 in 1988. The Somers' D for Cohort rose sharply in 1992 in .123. In 1996 the Somers' D increased to .229 before dropping to .129 in

2000. Cohort 3 had a Somers' D of .044 in 1992. In 1996 this increased to .083 before dropping to .054 in 2000. All of this data are displayed nicely in Figure 5 below.



Figure 5 Somers' D for Federal Spending on Food Stamps

This representation of the data helps graphically illustrate a few things. First, as with welfare spending opinions, Cohort 2 has a strong connection between their self-described ideology and their opinions on food stamps spending. Additionally, there is a period effect in 1996 that even Cohort 3 is a part in where all the cohorts have an increased relationship between their self-described ideology and their opinions on food stamps spending. It is also worth noting that Cohort 2 has a higher Somers' D than Cohort 1 even after the period effect is over and all the Somers' D values drop in 2000. Cohort 3 consistently has the lowest Somers' D out of the three cohorts here, just like they did when the Somers' D for welfare was observed. This cements the fact that Cohort 3 is not thinking about economic issues when they are self-describing their

ideology, or at least not government spending on social programs. However, just like when Somers' D values were being observed for welfare, there are age effects being intermingled with generational effects, although once again age effects are certainly not solely responsible for the substantial discrepancies between Cohort 3 and Cohort 1/ Cohort 2. Although it is interesting that not even Cohort 3 was immune from the period effect in 1996. It is also worth noting that while Cohort 1 seemed to be the cohort that heavily identified with social issues, Cohort 2 seems to be the cohort that identifies the most with economic issues.

POLITCAL KNOWLEDGE AND INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Levels of Political Knowledge

When levels of political knowledge are observed, clear-cut and unsurprising results are seen in the data. Without exception, each cohort is getting more knowledgeable as they age and this is evidenced by the fact that as each cohort ages, they all have an increased number of respondents categorized as having "Fairly High" or "Very High" levels of political information. Also telling it the fact that each time a "new" cohort appeared in the data for the first time it had a lower number of people categorized as "Fairly High" or "Very High" when compared to all the cohorts that had come before it (so Cohort 2 had a lower number of people categorized as having "Fairly High" or "Very High" levels of political knowledge when it first entered the data in 1988 compared to Cohort 1, and Cohort 3 had lower levels compared to Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 when it entered the data in 1992 and so on). For example, in 1992 Cohort 1 15.9% labeled as having "Very High" knowledge, while Cohort 2 had 10.1% labeled as "Very High" and Cohort 3 had 6.6%. In the same year, Cohort 1 had 30.6% labeled as having "Fairly High" political knowledge, while Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 had 28.6% and 24.4% labeled as "Fairly High", respectively. The reasons for older citizens being more informed compared to younger citizens is not much of a surprise. As Clawson and Oxley explain, "As people progress through the life cycle, they are simply exposed to more political information. Older citizens have more experiences, such as buying a house and paying property taxes, that younger people are less likely to have" (Clawson and Oxley 199). In others words, older people are simply exposed to more things that make them want to be politically informed, and young people are generally not exposed to the same experiences. Age also impacts how much each of the age cohorts turns out

to vote. As Lewis-Beck et al. explain, “Voting, for many citizens, is an acquired taste, and the appetite grows with eating” (Lewis-Beck 103). So, age impacts voter turnout in addition to political knowledge. While this data show how levels of political information are related to age, there are also many other variables intermingled with age such as income, education, and gender among countless others. So then, the next analysis will look at the same data while controlling for education to ascertain any new information the controlled data illustrates.

Levels of Political Knowledge with Education Acting as a Control

When the data is looked at with education acting as a control the profound influence education has on political knowledge is shown. For example, in 1996 those in Cohort 1 with no education higher than the high school level had 3.1% with “Very High” political knowledge, while Cohort 2 had 4.5%, and Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 had 0% with “Very High” knowledge. Those from Cohort 1 with a college education or advanced degree in 1996 had 23.2% with “Very High” knowledge, while Cohort 2 had 34.2%, Cohort 3 had 23.4%, and Cohort 4 had 14.3% with “Very High” political knowledge. It is also worth to note that in 1996, among those with a college degree or an advanced degree in Cohort 1, the percentage of people with below average political knowledge (“Fairly Low” or “Very Low” political knowledge) makes up less than 2% of respondents. Indeed, when only the college educated or those with advanced degrees are observed for any cohort in 1996, every cohort has less than 20% with below average political knowledge. These patterns observed in 1996 are indicative of what is seen throughout all of the years and cohorts within the data. While the data undoubtedly show the importance of age since there is a general (though imperfect) increase in political knowledge in each of the cohorts as they age, the profound impact of education on political knowledge can hardly be overstated.

Niemi and Junn say that, "…formal education is the single most important factor differentiating those who know more about politics from those who know less" (Niemi and Junn 13). So, the control of education has illustrated an important point. While initially the data showed age as a very strong indicator of political knowledge, the control of education has shown that education is in fact the strongest indicator of political knowledge while age is still a factor, though less important.

Interest in Public Affairs

When data on the interest people have in public affairs is observed, some clear patterns emerge as the cohorts age. For example, Cohort 1 had 50.4% following public affairs at least some of the time in 1984. In 1988 this number dips to 48.7% before jumping to 66.4% in 1992. In 1996, 57.6% of Cohort 1 followed public affairs at least some of the time and in 2000 this percent stayed about the same at 59.2%. The data for Cohort 2 show a similar pattern with a general upward trend in the percentage of people that follow public affairs at least some of the time. In 1988, 45.4% of Cohort 2 followed politics some of the time, at a minimum. In 1992 this number rises to 59.8% before falling to 44.6% in 1996. In 2000 the percentage of Cohort 2 following politics at least some of the time rises to 53.4%, and in 2004 the percentage of people in Cohort 2 following politics at least some of the time rises again to 64%. Cohort 3 had 56.1% of people following politics at least some of the time in 1992. In 1996 this number dips to 51.4%, and in 2000 this number stays steady at 50%. Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 show a pattern of increasing interest in public affairs, although this pattern is certainly not perfect. Still, the relationship between age and increased interest in public affairs is obvious. Clawson and Oxley note that, "…those with more education and higher incomes are more concerned with political happenings.

Age, in particular, has a strong relationship with political interest" (Clawson and Oxley 204-205). As the data have shown, and as Clawson and Oxley have noted, there is a strong relationship between interest in public affairs and age. Indeed, this relationship is seen across all of the cohorts. But, it is possible education is playing a large, hidden role in the data. And as Clawson and Oxley noted, education plays a role in interest in public affairs in addition to age.

Interest in Public Affairs with Education Acting as a Control

When the data on interest in public affairs has education acting as a control, the strong relationship between education and interest in public affairs is revealed. The first thing that stands out when education is controlled for is the overall higher percentages of respondents who follow public affairs. For example, those in Cohort 1 with a high school education had 61.1% following public affairs at least some of the time in 1996, and this was the highest percentage of respondents following politics at least some of the time for those in Cohort 1 with a high school education. The next highest percentage of people in Cohort 1 with a high school education was 50.5% in 1992. Those in Cohort 1 with a college degree or higher had their lowest percentage of people following politics at least some of the time in 1996 (which is coincidentally the same year those in Cohort 1 with a high school education had their highest percentage) at 63.5%. So, even when the people in Cohort 1 with a high school education have their highest percentage compared to the lowest percentage of those in Cohort 1 with a college degree or higher, those with a college degree or higher still follow politics more. And it is important to point out that for Cohort 1 as a whole 1996 seems to be an anomaly, as the data points for those in Cohort 1 with a high school education and those with a college degree or higher are uncharacteristically high and low, respectively. And yet despite this apparent anomaly, those with a college degree or higher

still follow politics more, showing just how important education is. Cohort 2 shows a similar pattern to Cohort 1 in that education proves to be an important factor in how much the cohort follows politics. For example, for those in Cohort 2 with a high school education, 38.8% followed public affairs at least some of the time in 1988, 42.4% in 1992, 37.3% in 1996 and 28.9% in 2000. Those in cohort 2 with at least a college degree had 76% follow politics at least some of the time in 1988. In 1992 this number jumped to 83% before dipping to 55.5% in 1996. In 2000 this number jumped back up to 72.6%. So then, Cohort 2 confirms what was seen in the data for Cohort 1; that is, education plays a significant role in exactly how interested people are in public affairs, and it would be wrong to attribute interest in public affairs solely to age.

Observing what the cohorts thought the most important national problem facing the U.S. before the Soviet Union fell and after the Soviet Union fell provides an opportunity to test just how strong period effects can be. As Bartels puts it, "The end of the Cold War… provides a remarkable opportunity to examine the dynamics of opinion change in the face of fundamental changes in the context and political underpinnings of U.S. defense policy" (479). In other words, the end of the Cold War provides an opportunity to examine a potential period effect unlike many others.

OPINIONS ON THE MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROBLEM AND THE STANDING OF THE U.S. BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11

Opinions on the Most Important National Problem

In 1984 when Cohort 1 was asked what they thought the most important national problem was, 39% answered "Foreign Affairs and National Defense". In 1988 as the Cold War was calming down, this number is cut by more than half to 14.5%. 1988 was also the first year Cohort 2 was in the data, and they had 11.9% of people say that "Foreign Affairs and National Defense" was the most important national problem facing the United States. So, both Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 had their perceptions on what they thought the most important national was impacted by the ending of the Cold War. In 1992, only 3.3% of Cohort 1 thought that "Foreign Affairs and National Defense" was the most important national problem, while Cohort 2 and Cohort 3 had 1.7% and 4.7% who thought that "Foreign Affairs and National Defense" was the most important problem, respectively. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde say that there was a, "…lower concern over foreign than domestic issues in 1992…" (185). The data support this since as the percentage of people who thought that "Foreign Affairs and National Defense" was the most important national problem dropped, the percentage of people who thought that "Economics" and "Social Welfare" were the most important national problem increased. Therefore, the data illustrate a few points. First, all of the cohorts were affected by the ending of the Cold War equally. That is, the period effect was so strong that it affected all of the cohorts basically equally, not just the young. However, this is not to say that period effects always impact the young and the old alike. Rather, this is just a good example of how some period effects are so strong they cut across cohort lines and impact everybody basically the same way. So in short, the data here illustrate a very strong period effect but should not be taken as

indicative of all period effects since the ending of the Cold War was a very special and unique event.

Opinions on the World Standing of the U.S. Before and After 9/11

Another type of unique, powerful period effect happened between 2000 and 2004 when opinions on the world position of the United States were recorded. Between 2000 and 2004 the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred in addition to the invasion of Iraq. Obviously, two traumatic events happened in a relatively short amount of time, and the impact on opinions on the standing of the United States in the world should yield interesting results. The data in this study was collected at two points, in pre-9/11 in 2000 and post-9/11 and after the invasion of Iraq in 2004. Saad has identified five major stages of public opinion between 2000 and 2004. These stages are "Pre-9/11", "Post-9/11", "Pre-Iraq War", "Iraq War Rally', and "Post Iraq War" (Saad 1). The data in this study were only collected from 2000 and 2004, or roughly "Pre-9/11" and "Post Iraq War", so it is important to be aware that between these two stages there was fluctuation of opinions that are invisible in the data in this study. But, the two years of data used in this study are also the most reliable since they are taken from before and after most of the fluctuation happened.

In 2000, Cohort 2 had 31.6% of respondents say they thought the position of the United States was weaker compared to previous years. Cohort 4 had 24.8% of respondents say they thought the position of the United States was weaker compared to earlier years while Cohort 5 had 16.1%. In 2004, after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, Cohort 1 had 38.6% of respondents say they thought the position of the United States was weaker. Cohort 4 had 45.9% say they thought the position of the United States was weaker, compared to 24.8% in 2000. Cohort 5 had 61.2%

say they thought the position of the United States was weaker in 2994 compared to 16.1% in 2000. Obviously, the younger cohorts, Cohort 4 and Cohort 5, were more influenced by the world events at the time. These opinions expressing a perceived weaker standing for the United States in the world have a lot to do with the "Post Iraq War" stage, as the causalities and realities of the Iraq War set in after the "Iraq War Rally" stage (Saad 1). When the data is broken down more into age cohorts like in this study, it becomes very clear that the young in Cohort 4 and Cohort 5 were influenced much more by the period than the older were in Cohort 2. In short, the data on the perceived standing of the United States before and after 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq are a good example of how the young can be more influenced by events while the old are not swayed as easily.

SOURCES OF NEWS

Newspaper Reading

Studies have continuously shown that reading newspapers is a strong predictor of political knowledge. As Chaffee and Frank put it, "It is, indeed, rare to find a study in which newspaper reading is not a significant predictor of political knowledge" (48). So, it is safe to say that almost every study investigating the impact of newspaper reading deems it having a very strong connection to political knowledge. This is important knowledge to have as we look at the newspaper reading habits of each of the cohorts throughout the years since it will tell us what reading (or not reading) newspapers means for people. Also, when looking a newspaper readership, the percentages calculated represent who reads the newspaper at least four times a week.

In 1984 Cohort 1 had 32.9% of respondents read the newspaper at least four times a week. In 1988 this number rose to 40.8%, and in 1992 this number stays basically the same at 39%. And in 1996 the percentage of people in Cohort 1 who read the newspaper at least 4 times a week holds steady at 38.9%. In 2000 the respondents from Cohort 1 who read the newspaper at least four times a week dips to 35%. So, then, Cohort 1 has an overall upward trend in the percentage of respondents who read newspapers at a minimum of four times a week. This is not surprising, since earlier in this study it was revealed that political knowledge and the need to be informed increase with age. Cohort 2 shows a very similar pattern to Cohort 1, having 35.9% of respondents read the newspaper at least four times a week in 1988, the first year Cohort 2 is in the data. In 1992 this number dips to 33.9% before dipping again to 30.4% in 1996. In 2000 this number jumps up to 37.3%. While the rises in newspaper readership are not as strong in Cohort 2

as they are in Cohort 1, overall the patterns for the two cohorts are very similar. While Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 show very similar levels of newspaper readership, Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 do not have the same levels as Cohort 1 and Cohort 2.

The first year Cohort 3 comes into the data is 1992, and the percentage of respondents who read the newspaper four days a week is 25.6%. In 1996 this number holds steady at 25.4% before rising slightly to 28% in 2000. Cohort 4, who enters the data in 1996, has 26.5% of the Cohort reading newspapers at least four times a week the first year it enters the data. In 2000, Cohort 4 has 25.7% of respondents who read newspapers at least four times a week. The trends Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 are showing are different than those Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 are showing because they are starting with substantially lower levels of initial readership of newspapers. In 2004, data is only available for Cohort 2 and Cohort 4. Cohort 2 had 45% of respondents read the newspaper a minimum of four times a week, while Cohort 4 only had 24.8%, so the patters seen earlier continue on in 2004. Indeed, there is a clear distinction between Cohort 1/ Cohort 2 and Cohort 3/ Cohort 4. Perhaps Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 rely more heavily on news programs on the television to get their information, or perhaps they are not as interested in being informed about public affairs. No matter the cause, there is without a doubt a clear divide in the cohorts with regard to their newspaper reading habits, and perhaps a look at who watches televised news programs would help clear up the discrepancy.

National Television News Programs

When the cohorts were examined to see how often they watched national news on the television, percentages were calculated to determine who watched the national news at least four times a week. For Cohort 1 in 1984, 29.9% of Cohort 1 watched the national news at a minimum

of four times a week. In 1988 this number jumped to 56.9% for Cohort 1. For Cohort 2 in the same year this number was 58.7%. In 1992, Cohort 1 had 55.8% of respondents watch the national news at least four times a week. Cohort 2 had 53.5% in 1992 while Cohort 3 had 47.3%. It is worth noting that the percentage of respondents from Cohort 3 who watch the national news are much closer to Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 compared to the percentages for newspaper readership. In 1996 Cohort 1 had 34.2% of respondents who watched the national news at least four times a day while Cohort 2 had 29.2%. Cohort 3 had 30.5%, while Cohort 4 had 17.9%. These percentages are a substantial drop from the 1992 numbers, and in 2000 it is obvious that these drops are not a fluke. The 2000 numbers are 30.6% for Cohort 1, 32.8% for Cohort 2, 21.6% for Cohort 3 and 25.7% for Cohort 4. Before the period effect in 1996, Cohort 3 had a similar percent of people who watched the national news at least four times a week compared to Cohort 1 and Cohort 2. The reason for this drop, according to Clawson and Oxley, was a change in the content shown on the national news from "hard news" to "soft news" (63). This basically means that news stations shifted their focus from news related to public policy to news items not connected to public policy. This was done as a result of increased competition by news stations and so was meant to increase rankings, although ironically it seems to have decreased news viewership. So, news viewership initially appeared to be different than newspaper readership, but the period effect in 1996 fundamentally changed news viewership, and therefore makes it difficult to draw any definite conclusions other than the fact that there was indeed a very powerful period effect in 1996. So, from the data in this study, it would seem that Cohort 3 and Cohort 4 pay less attention to public affairs compared to Cohort 1 and Cohort 2, since they do

not read newspapers as much and they do not watch the national news enough to make up for their lack of newspaper reading.

The Internet as a Source of Campaign Information

The internet, a relatively new and extremely powerful medium, has recently come into play in the political arena. The American National Election Survey Questionnaire has unfortunately not caught up to this new medium, so there are very few questions related to the internet in the survey. One of the few questions available will be analyzed, though. From 1996 to 2004, people were asked if they had received election information off the internet, and respondents answered with a simple "Yes" or "No". In 1996, 27.3% of Cohort 2 received election information off the internet while 31.9% of Cohort 4 did. In 2000, 54.6% of Cohort 2 received election information off the internet, while 53.6% of Cohort 4 did as well as 53.3% of Cohort 5. In 2004, 75% of Cohort 2 received election information off the internet. Cohort 4 and Cohort 5 had 71.7% and 72.4%, respectively. Obviously, the internet is becoming a medium that went from being used by less than a third of each cohort in 1996 to being used by about three fourths of each cohort in 2004 for campaign information. It is obvious the internet is becoming what is perhaps the most powerful campaign tool and will continue to have an important role in future elections.

CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS

In closing, this study covered a broad range of topics in the political realm while trying to decipher the impact age has on political socialization. First, the U.S. Presidential elections from 1984 to 2004 were analyzed. The data illustrated how George H.W. Bush was not immune to strong period effects of the time. Indeed, all the cohorts in this study thought that the economy was more important than foreign affairs; even the youngest cohorts who are most detached from the economy felt this way, demonstrating how powerful the period effect was. This means that all the cohorts were less likely to vote for Bush, and this period effect that impacted all cohorts contributed to Bush's defeat in 1992. In addition to the changing perceptions the public had on what the most pressing national problem was, Ross Perot entered the Presidential elections of 1992 and 1996. The data showed how Cohort 2 voted more for Perot than Cohort 1, and this was to be expected since Cohort 2 is younger than Cohort 1, and so the views of Cohort 2 were more elastic. Additionally, the 2000 elections prove that the voting patterns of the cohorts fit the *impressionable years* model. So, the 1984-2000 elections proved to have many different period effects. But, when the voting patterns of Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 were analyzed, the *impressionable years* model fit the data the best. Also, when strength of preference for Presidential vote was examined, no clear patterns emerged regarding age and strength of preference. However, this is due to the fact that strength of preference has a lot to do with short-term factors (e.g. personality characteristics of the candidates). What was more telling of strengthening partisanship as people age was simply measuring the percentage of strong partisans in each age cohort throughout the years.

When the percentages of "Strong Partisans" were calculated for the cohorts throughout the years the trends fit the *impressionable years* model very well. Each cohort had a higher percentage of "Strong Partisans" as they got older. When ideology was looked at each cohort also got more conservative, according to their self-classification. However, what this meant exactly was not initially clear. In other words, people identifying themselves as more conservative could mean that people were actually getting more conservative, or it could mean that people merely thought they were getting more conservative. When views on abortion were examined, they did not become more conservative along with the respondents' self-identifying ideology. Indeed, abortion views become more liberal. Even conservatives were more permissive of abortion as they aged when Party ID was controlled for. Indeed, if respondents were really becoming more conservative, it was certainly not because of their abortion views. By contrast, people did in fact become more conservative as they aged in their views towards affirmative action. That is, as the cohorts aged, they generally had less support for affirmative action programs. When views on gay rights were observed, specifically whether or not gays should be able to serve openly in the military, respondents became more permissive of gays serving in the military. This means that the opinions of the cohorts generally became more liberal regarding gay rights, and so this issue did not match the growing self-identifying conservatism of the cohorts.

The Somers' D values for each of these issues gives some insight into how much weight the cohorts give each issue when they identify their ideology. The Somers' D values for abortion had an upward trend for all of the cohorts. Cohort 1 started with the highest Somers' D and maintained it throughout the data despite the general upward trend shown by all the cohorts. Gay

rights, on the other hand, had a general decrease in saliency. Interestingly, Cohort 1 maintains a higher Somers' D for gay rights throughout the general downward trend in the data. When Somers' D was calculated for affirmative action the statistics showed that affirmative action is not very salient for people compared to abortion and gay rights. It is also worth to note that Cohort 1 seems to place a high emphasis on social issues when they are forming their ideology, as shown by their high Somers' D values for abortion and gay rights when compared to Cohort 2 and Cohort 3.

Opinions on welfare spending had similar trends in opinion for all of the cohorts. All of the cohorts thought that spending should be increased, and then decreased. Once welfare spending was decreased, people then thought it should be increased. This is similar to a period effect during the Carter Administration and Reagan Administration, where people wanted an increase in spending for defense, and then once it was increased people wanted it decreased. In other words, sometimes in public opinion people want something, and once they get it they want the opposite. It is also difficult to determine if opinions on welfare are becoming more conservative or not since they seem to be impacted so much by short- term forces. When opinions on food stamps were examined there was a clear downward trend in support for food stamps, with the exception of Cohort 3 in the year 2000, when they had a sharp increase in support for the program. Overall though, opinions on food stamps generally become more conservative for the cohorts as they age.

When Somers' D was calculated for welfare spending there was a general increase in saliency for Cohort 1 as well as for Cohort 2, while Cohort 3 had a Somers' D that remained low and stable. It is also worth noting while Cohort 1 had the highest Somers' D values for social

issues, Cohort 2 has a higher Somers' D for welfare opinions once it ages a bit. So, it would seem Cohort 1 is thinking more of social issues when they form their ideology. This is reinforced by the Somers' D values for food stamps, where Cohort 2 once again has a higher Somers' D higher than Cohort 1 once the people in Cohort 2 aged a bit.

When political knowledge and interest in public affairs was examined, there was a very strong relationship between the variables and age. However, when education acted as a control when these variables were being observed, it revealed the very strong relationship the variables had with education, in addition to age. So, political knowledge and interest in public affairs are strongly related to both age and education.

When data on the most important national problem was in the eyes' of the cohorts before and after the Cold War, it was revealed that the period effect of the ending of the Cold War was so strong that it impacted all cohorts about the same. This is evident in the data from the fact that all the cohorts thought that "Foreign Affairs and National Defense" was becoming less and less of a major problem compared to domestic issues after the Cold War was over. When data on the perceived standing of the United States was viewed, it showed how the young were more impacted by the 9/11 terrorist attacks since they had a bigger change in their opinions of the world standing of the United States after 9/11.

When data on news sources was analyzed, it was revealed that Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 read the newspaper at similarly high levels. Cohort 3 and Cohort 4, on the other hand, read them at similarly low levels. National news programs on the television have seen a dramatically lower amount of viewers since the mid-90's across all cohorts. This was due to a change in content across all major news networks because of the competition between them. It was also revealed

that about 75% of each cohort got election information off the internet in 2004, showing how powerful the internet will be for future elections.

The reasons why some political opinions and orientations are stable, while others are fluid and frequently changing, are not easy to come by. Indeed, by looking at the data in this study, no clear-cut answers immediately jump out. While no concrete answers are available it is certainly possible to make some speculations as to why opinions change the way they do. Additionally, the data in this study showed people holding conflicting opinions at times. For example, most people thought they were getting more conservative as they aged, and yet these same people came to hold what are considered liberal opinions on some issues.

Some issues were clearly influenced by short- term effects and therefore explaining why these particular issues changed frequently is relatively simple. A good example of an issue that is strongly impacted by short-term effects is strength of Presidential vote choice. At first I hypothesized that respondents would have stronger Presidential vote preferences as they got older, similar to how people have stronger partisanship towards a certainly ideology as they age, but the data did not support this. After consulting outside information, it became clear that the data did not support this because strength of preference relies almost exclusively on short-term factors such as the personality or looks of a particular candidate. So, what may appear to be a *non-attitude* in certain instances may just reflect an issue that relies on short-term factors.

While some issue opinions depend almost solely on short-term effects, there are other issues that are impacted heavily by short-term effects only in certain instances, and not knowing about the impact these short-term effects have would have made the translation of what the data was representing much different. For example, the data on the Presidential elections in 1992 and

1996 first appeared to be anomalies because of the high percentage of votes independent candidates were getting. However, it quickly became clear those years were effected heavily by short-term effects, since Perot was in both of those elections, and the vote choices went back to "normal" once Perot was not in the picture any more in 2000. Another issue significantly impacted by short-term effects was gay rights; specifically, the right for homosexuals to serve openly in the military. This effect started in the mid and late 90's and continued on into the 2000's and it changed opinions towards homosexuals towards more rights for them. Whether this change is permanent is yet to be seen, but the point is that short-term effects can significantly alter the way the data look and the way it is interpreted. So, this data have shown the impact of short-term effects cannot be under estimated, as well as the fact that what may appear to be inconsistencies or anomalies in the data are actually be manipulated by short-term factors.

While short-term factors have shown to be quite a force in certain instances there are of course some things that short-term effects cannot account for. One of the things short-term effects cannot account for is the contradictory opinions the cohorts had as they aged where they continually self-identified themselves as more conservative, and also came to hold more liberal issue positions. The best example of this is the opinions on abortion examined in this study where people became more liberal with their abortion opinions as they aged. So then, for opinions that cannot be influenced heavily by short-term factors such as abortion and ideology, why do people hold these opinions? And do these opinions mean anything? I think it would be helpful to go back to a quote from The American Voter from earlier in this study that says, "…in general the Republican Party has an air of respectability, conservatism, and social status which the Democratic Party does not fully share. If we assume that these values have an increasing

appeal to older people we have the essential conditions for the creation of an age dimension in political partisanship" (Campbell et al. 165-166). Perhaps as people age and they are self-identifying their ideology they are thinking more of a particular image and status they would like to have, and not what party or ideology their issue positions line up with. I think this is the most plausible reason for why, as this study showed, ideology and issue positions are not always a perfect match. Indeed, this explanation fits the data well and other studies, such as the one in The American Voter, show similar results. Of course, the hypothesis that people are not thinking of their issue positions as they identify their ideology as they get older is just that, a hypothesis. It is important to make clear that these could be *nonattitudes*, and people have contradictory opinions because they have very little political knowledge. However, I think in this particular situation, the criteria people have for their Party ID as they age is the best explanation. I also think future research should focus on what people are thinking when they express contradictory opinions. For example, follow up questions once contradictory opinions are identified in a study could simply ask people how they came to their self-identified Party ID and also a contradictory issue position. I think the most important research in political opinions and orientations in the future will focus on the thought processes people go through when they form contradictory opinions like this. While definite answers may never be available I think going towards trying to get these answers is the next step in research like this.

APPENDIX A: AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY DATA USED IN THIS RESEARCH

Table 1 Presidential Vote Choice

Year of Study				cohort					
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1984	Party of Pres Vote- Major Parties,	1. Democrat	Count	74					74
			% within cohort	42.5%					42.5%
		2. Republican	Count	98					98
			% within cohort	56.3%					56.3%
		3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor party candidates and write-ins)	Count	2					2
			% within cohort	1.1%					1.1%
	Total		Count	174					174
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Party of Pres Vote- Major Parties,	1. Democrat	Count	44	52				96
			% within cohort	49.4%	47.3%				48.2%
		2. Republican	Count	45	57				102
			% within cohort	50.6%	51.8%				51.3%
		3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor party candidates and write-ins)	Count	0	1				1
			% within cohort	.0%	.9%				.5%
	Total		Count	89	110				199
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Party of Pres Vote- Major Parties,	1. Democrat	Count	78	57	81			216
			% within cohort	41.7%	39.9%	50.0%			43.9%
		2. Republican	Count	75	43	40			158
			% within cohort	40.1%	30.1%	24.7%			32.1%

		3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor party candidates and write-ins)	Count	34	43	41			118
			% within cohort	18.2%	30.1%	25.3%			24.0%
	Total		Count	187	143	162			492
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Party of Pres Vote- Major Parties,	1. Democrat	Count	59	46	43	35		183
			% within cohort	47.6%	49.5%	61.4%	50.7%		51.4%
		2. Republican	Count	57	33	19	24		133
			% within cohort	46.0%	35.5%	27.1%	34.8%		37.4%
		3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor party candidates and write-ins)	Count	8	14	8	10		40
			% within cohort	6.5%	15.1%	11.4%	14.5%		11.2%
	Total		Count	124	93	70	69		356
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Party of Pres Vote- Major Parties,	1. Democrat	Count	51	50	29	35	50	215
			% within cohort	46.4%	45.5%	36.3%	56.5%	58.1%	48.0%
		2. Republican	Count	56	55	47	24	29	211
			% within cohort	50.9%	50.0%	58.8%	38.7%	33.7%	47.1%
		3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor party candidates and write-ins)	Count	3	5	4	3	7	22
			% within cohort	2.7%	4.5%	5.0%	4.8%	8.1%	4.9%
	Total		Count	110	110	80	62	86	448
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Party of Pres Vote- Major Parties,	1. Democrat	Count		23		47	35	105
			% within cohort		41.8%		45.2%	60.3%	48.4%
		2. Republican	Count		31		55	22	108
			% within cohort		56.4%		52.9%	37.9%	49.8%

		3. Other (incl. 3rd/minor party candidates and write-ins)	Count		1		2	1	4
			% within cohort		1.8%		1.9%	1.7%	1.8%
	Total		Count		55		104	58	217
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 2 Most Opinions on Most Important National Problem

Year of Study				cohort					
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1984	Most Important National Problem (1)	01. Agricultural	Count	2					2
			% within cohort	.6%					.6%
		02. Economics;Business;Consumer Issues	Count	96					96
			% within cohort	31.2%					31.2%
		03. Foreign Affairs & National Defense	Count	120					120
			% within cohort	39.0%					39.0%
		04. Government Functioning	Count	5					5
			% within cohort	1.6%					1.6%
		06. Natural Resources	Count	2					2
			% within cohort	.6%					.6%
		07. Public Order	Count	11					11

			% within cohort	3.6%					3.6%
		08. Racial Problems	Count	1					1
			% within cohort	.3%					.3%
		09. Social Welfare	Count	69					69
			% within cohort	22.4%					22.4%
		97. Other problems	Count	2					2
			% within cohort	.6%					.6%
	Total		Count	308					308
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Most Important National Problem (1)	01. Agricultural	Count	2	2				4
			% within cohort	1.3%	.9%				1.1%
		02. Economics;Business;Consumer Issues	Count	61	75				136
			% within cohort	40.1%	33.2%				36.0%
		03. Foreign Affairs & National Defense	Count	22	27				49
			% within cohort	14.5%	11.9%				13.0%
		04. Government Functioning	Count	2	3				5
			% within cohort	1.3%	1.3%				1.3%
		05. Labor Issues	Count	0	1				1
			% within cohort	.0%	.4%				.3%
		06. Natural Resources	Count	9	16				25
			% within cohort	5.9%	7.1%				6.6%
		07. Public Order	Count	18	50				68
			% within cohort	11.8%	22.1%				18.0%
		08. Racial Problems	Count	2	0				2
			% within cohort	1.3%	.0%				.5%
		09. Social Welfare	Count	35	52				87

			% within cohort	23.0%	23.0%				23.0%
		97. Other problems	Count	1	0				1
			% within cohort	.7%	.0%				.3%
	Total		Count	152	226				378
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Most Important National Problem (1)	02. Economics;Business;Consumer Issues	Count	98	75	91			264
			% within cohort	46.7%	41.4%	38.7%			42.2%
		03. Foreign Affairs & National Defense	Count	7	3	11			21
			% within cohort	3.3%	1.7%	4.7%			3.4%
		04. Government Functioning	Count	4	5	2			11
			% within cohort	1.9%	2.8%	.9%			1.8%
		06. Natural Resources	Count	4	3	5			12
			% within cohort	1.9%	1.7%	2.1%			1.9%
		07. Public Order	Count	22	24	23			69
			% within cohort	10.5%	13.3%	9.8%			11.0%
		08. Racial Problems	Count	2	6	5			13
			% within cohort	1.0%	3.3%	2.1%			2.1%
		09. Social Welfare	Count	73	65	97			235
			% within cohort	34.8%	35.9%	41.3%			37.5%
		97. Other problems	Count	0	0	1			1
			% within cohort	.0%	.0%	.4%			.2%
	Total		Count	210	181	235			626
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Most Important National Problem (1)	02. Economics;Business;Consumer Issues	Count	14	12	16	13		55
			% within cohort	17.3%	17.4%	27.1%	20.3%		20.1%

		03. Foreign Affairs & National Defense	Count	2	1	1	0		4
			% within cohort	2.5%	1.4%	1.7%	.0%		1.5%
		04. Government Functioning	Count	2	3	1	2		8
			% within cohort	2.5%	4.3%	1.7%	3.1%		2.9%
		06. Natural Resources	Count	2	0	2	2		6
			% within cohort	2.5%	.0%	3.4%	3.1%		2.2%
		07. Public Order	Count	31	20	15	14		80
			% within cohort	38.3%	29.0%	25.4%	21.9%		29.3%
		08. Racial Problems	Count	2	1	2	0		5
			% within cohort	2.5%	1.4%	3.4%	.0%		1.8%
		09. Social Welfare	Count	27	32	22	33		114
			% within cohort	33.3%	46.4%	37.3%	51.6%		41.8%
		97. Other problems	Count	1	0	0	0		1
			% within cohort	1.2%	.0%	.0%	.0%		.4%
	Total		Count	81	69	59	64		273
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Most Important National Problem (1)	02. Economics;Business;Consumer Issues	Count	12	14	9	7	15	57
			% within cohort	12.9%	17.1%	12.5%	13.2%	16.5%	14.6%
		03. Foreign Affairs & National Defense	Count	8	6	7	4	8	33
			% within cohort	8.6%	7.3%	9.7%	7.5%	8.8%	8.4%
		04. Government Functioning	Count	4	2	4	1	5	16
			% within cohort	4.3%	2.4%	5.6%	1.9%	5.5%	4.1%
		05. Labor Issues	Count	0	0	0	1	0	1
			% within cohort	.0%	.0%	.0%	1.9%	.0%	.3%
		06. Natural Resources	Count	2	4	0	1	4	11
			% within cohort	2.2%	4.9%	.0%	1.9%	4.4%	2.8%

	07. Public Order	Count	21	20	23	12	18	94
		% within cohort	22.6%	24.4%	31.9%	22.6%	19.8%	24.0%
	08. Racial Problems	Count	0	1	0	0	1	2
		% within cohort	.0%	1.2%	.0%	.0%	1.1%	.5%
	09. Social Welfare	Count	46	35	29	27	40	177
		% within cohort	49.5%	42.7%	40.3%	50.9%	44.0%	45.3%
Total		Count	93	82	72	53	91	391
		% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 3 Strength of Presidential Vote Choice

Year of Study				cohort					
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1984	Strength- Presidential Vote Prefere	1. Strong	Count	142					142
			% within cohort	80.2%					80.2%
		5. Not strong	Count	35					35
			% within cohort	19.8%					19.8%
	Total		Count	177					177
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Strength- Presidential Vote Prefere	1. Strong	Count	64	82				146
			% within cohort	71.9%	74.5%				73.4%
		5. Not strong	Count	25	28				53
			% within cohort	28.1%	25.5%				26.6%
	Total		Count	89	110				199
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%

1992	Strength- Presidential Vote Prefere	1. Strong	Count	148	118	134			400
			% within cohort	78.7%	81.4%	82.2%			80.6%
		5. Not strong	Count	40	27	29			96
			% within cohort	21.3%	18.6%	17.8%			19.4%
	Total		Count	188	145	163			496
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Strength- Presidential Vote Prefere	1. Strong	Count	86	61	50	56		253
			% within cohort	69.4%	65.6%	71.4%	81.2%		71.1%
		5. Not strong	Count	38	32	20	13		103
			% within cohort	30.6%	34.4%	28.6%	18.8%		28.9%
	Total		Count	124	93	70	69		356
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Strength- Presidential Vote Prefere	1. Strong	Count	73	83	65	49	70	340
			% within cohort	66.4%	75.5%	81.3%	79.0%	81.4%	75.9%
		5. Not strong	Count	37	27	15	13	16	108
			% within cohort	33.6%	24.5%	18.8%	21.0%	18.6%	24.1%
	Total		Count	110	110	80	62	86	448
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Strength- Presidential Vote Prefere	1. Strong	Count		47		78	53	178
			% within cohort		85.5%		75.0%	91.4%	82.0%
		5. Not strong	Count		8		26	5	39
			% within cohort		14.5%		25.0%	8.6%	18.0%
	Total		Count		55		104	58	217
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 4 Strength of Partisanship

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1984	Strength of R Partisanship	1. Independent or Apolitical	Count	70					70
			% within cohort	18.1%					18.1%
		2. Leaning Independent	Count	117					117
			% within cohort	30.3%					30.3%
		3. Weak Partisan	Count	133					133
			% within cohort	34.5%					34.5%
		4. Strong Partisan	Count	66					66
			% within cohort	17.1%					17.1%
	Total		Count	386					386
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Strength of R Partisanship	1. Independent or Apolitical	Count	23	52				75
			% within cohort	11.7%	18.1%				15.5%
		2. Leaning Independent	Count	64	84				148
			% within cohort	32.7%	29.2%				30.6%
		3. Weak Partisan	Count	56	91				147
			% within cohort	28.6%	31.6%				30.4%
		4. Strong Partisan	Count	53	61				114
			% within cohort	27.0%	21.2%				23.6%
	Total		Count	196	288				484
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Strength of R Partisanship	1. Independent or Apolitical	Count	35	37	62			134
			% within cohort	12.9%	15.7%	19.7%			16.3%

		2. Leaning Independent	Count	78	75	103			256
			% within cohort	28.8%	31.8%	32.7%			31.1%
		3. Weak Partisan	Count	100	78	100			278
			% within cohort	36.9%	33.1%	31.7%			33.8%
		4. Strong Partisan	Count	58	46	50			154
			% within cohort	21.4%	19.5%	15.9%			18.7%
	Total		Count	271	236	315			822
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Strength of R Partisanship	1. Independent or Apolitical	Count	19	14	14	19		66
			% within cohort	10.0%	9.0%	11.9%	11.0%		10.4%
		2. Leaning Independent	Count	48	38	37	58		181
			% within cohort	25.3%	24.4%	31.4%	33.5%		28.4%
		3. Weak Partisan	Count	66	63	37	60		226
			% within cohort	34.7%	40.4%	31.4%	34.7%		35.5%
		4. Strong Partisan	Count	57	41	30	36		164
			% within cohort	30.0%	26.3%	25.4%	20.8%		25.7%
	Total		Count	190	156	118	173		637
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Strength of R Partisanship	1. Independent or Apolitical	Count	25	15	26	18	42	126
			% within cohort	14.0%	8.6%	18.8%	15.9%	21.0%	15.7%
		2. Leaning Independent	Count	46	52	40	42	72	252
			% within cohort	25.8%	29.9%	29.0%	37.2%	36.0%	31.4%
		3. Weak Partisan	Count	52	53	38	25	53	221
			% within cohort	29.2%	30.5%	27.5%	22.1%	26.5%	27.5%
		4. Strong Partisan	Count	55	54	34	28	33	204
			% within cohort	30.9%	31.0%	24.6%	24.8%	16.5%	25.4%
	Total		Count	178	174	138	113	200	803

			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Strength of R Partisanship	1. Independent or Apolitical	Count		12		10	9	31
			% within cohort		13.5%		6.6%	10.5%	9.5%
		2. Leaning Independent	Count		29		47	22	98
			% within cohort		32.6%		30.9%	25.6%	30.0%
		3. Weak Partisan	Count		20		58	25	103
			% within cohort		22.5%		38.2%	29.1%	31.5%
		4. Strong Partisan	Count		28		37	30	95
			% within cohort		31.5%		24.3%	34.9%	29.1%
	Total		Count		89		152	86	327
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5 Self- Described Ideology

Year of Study				cohort					
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1984	R Position Lib-Cons 3-category Summ	1. Liberal	Count	112					112
			% within cohort	29.1%					29.1%
		3. Moderate ('middle of the road')	Count	101					101
			% within cohort	26.2%					26.2%
		5. Conservative	Count	141					141
			% within cohort	36.6%					36.6%
		6	Count	31					31
			% within cohort	8.1%					8.1%

	Total		Count	385					385
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	R Position Lib-Cons 3-category Summ	1. Liberal	Count	65	108				173
			% within cohort	33.2%	37.8%				35.9%
		3. Moderate ('middle of the road')	Count	13	22				35
			% within cohort	6.6%	7.7%				7.3%
		5. Conservative	Count	98	123				221
			% within cohort	50.0%	43.0%				45.9%
		6	Count	20	33				53
			% within cohort	10.2%	11.5%				11.0%
	Total		Count	196	286				482
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	R Position Lib-Cons 3-category Summ	1. Liberal	Count	98	89	136			323
			% within cohort	36.2%	37.6%	43.3%			39.3%
		3. Moderate ('middle of the road')	Count	15	17	13			45
			% within cohort	5.5%	7.2%	4.1%			5.5%
		5. Conservative	Count	143	117	138			398
			% within cohort	52.8%	49.4%	43.9%			48.4%
		6	Count	15	14	27			56
			% within cohort	5.5%	5.9%	8.6%			6.8%
	Total		Count	271	237	314			822
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	R Position Lib-Cons 3-category Summ	1. Liberal	Count	64	55	51	78		248
			% within cohort	33.7%	34.8%	43.2%	45.1%		38.8%
		3. Moderate ('middle of the road')	Count	20	18	9	14		61
			% within cohort	10.5%	11.4%	7.6%	8.1%		9.5%
		5. Conservative	Count	103	78	56	73		310

			% within cohort	54.2%	49.4%	47.5%	42.2%		48.5%
		6	Count	3	7	2	8		20
			% within cohort	1.6%	4.4%	1.7%	4.6%		3.1%
	Total		Count	190	158	118	173		639
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	R Position Lib-Cons 3-category Summ	1. Liberal	Count	24	25	22	20	42	133
			% within cohort	27.6%	29.4%	30.6%	37.7%	46.7%	34.4%
		3. Moderate ('middle of the road')	Count	2	2	2	7	10	23
			% within cohort	2.3%	2.4%	2.8%	13.2%	11.1%	5.9%
		5. Conservative	Count	59	55	41	24	27	206
			% within cohort	67.8%	64.7%	56.9%	45.3%	30.0%	53.2%
		6	Count	2	3	7	2	11	25
			% within cohort	2.3%	3.5%	9.7%	3.8%	12.2%	6.5%
	Total		Count	87	85	72	53	90	387
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	R Position Lib-Cons 3-category Summ	1. Liberal	Count		23		49	36	108
			% within cohort		30.7%		35.5%	48.6%	37.6%
		3. Moderate ('middle of the road')	Count		3		6	4	13
			% within cohort		4.0%		4.3%	5.4%	4.5%
		5. Conservative	Count		47		77	31	155
			% within cohort		62.7%		55.8%	41.9%	54.0%
		7. Refuses to choose (in follow-up [exc. 1988 moderates])	Count		2		4	3	9
			% within cohort		2.7%		2.9%	4.1%	3.1%
		8	Count		0		2	0	2
			% within cohort		.0%		1.4%	.0%	.7%
	Total		Count		75		138	74	287

			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6 Opinions on When Abortion Should be Legal

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1984	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	43					43
			% within cohort	11.4%					11.4%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	111					111
			% within cohort	29.4%					29.4%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	80					80
			% within cohort	21.2%					21.2%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	143					143
			% within cohort	37.9%					37.9%
	Total		Count	377					377
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	18	38				56
			% within cohort	9.2%	13.3%				11.7%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	54	90				144
			% within cohort	27.7%	31.6%				30.0%
		3. The law should permit	Count	36	47				83

		abortion for reasons other than	% within cohort	18.5%	16.5%				17.3%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	87	110				197
			% within cohort	44.6%	38.6%				41.0%
	Total		Count	195	285				480
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	22	12	31			65
			% within cohort	8.4%	5.2%	9.9%			8.1%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	74	72	88			234
			% within cohort	28.2%	31.0%	28.2%			29.0%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	38	31	34			103
			% within cohort	14.5%	13.4%	10.9%			12.8%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	128	117	159			404
			% within cohort	48.9%	50.4%	51.0%			50.1%
	Total		Count	262	232	312			806
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	21	19	9	20		69
			% within cohort	11.2%	12.4%	7.7%	11.6%		11.0%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	48	32	29	50		159
			% within cohort	25.7%	20.9%	24.8%	29.1%		25.3%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	22	27	20	33		102
			% within cohort	11.8%	17.6%	17.1%	19.2%		16.2%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	96	75	59	69		299
			% within cohort	51.3%	49.0%	50.4%	40.1%		47.5%

	Total		Count	187	153	117	172		629
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	18	28	8	9	23	86
			% within cohort	10.5%	16.6%	5.8%	8.3%	11.6%	11.0%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	39	36	46	35	73	229
			% within cohort	22.8%	21.3%	33.3%	32.4%	36.7%	29.2%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	26	24	17	20	21	108
			% within cohort	15.2%	14.2%	12.3%	18.5%	10.6%	13.8%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	88	81	67	44	82	362
			% within cohort	51.5%	47.9%	48.6%	40.7%	41.2%	46.1%
	Total		Count	171	169	138	108	199	785
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count		9		17	10	36
			% within cohort		12.0%		12.4%	14.1%	12.7%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count		21		35	16	72
			% within cohort		28.0%		25.5%	22.5%	25.4%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count		12		26	10	48
			% within cohort		16.0%		19.0%	14.1%	17.0%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count		33		59	35	127
			% within cohort		44.0%		43.1%	49.3%	44.9%
	Total		Count		75		137	71	283
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 7Opinions on When Abortion Should be Legal with Education Controlled For

R Position Lib-Cons 3-category Summ	year				cohort					Total
					1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1. Liberal	1984.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	5					5
				% within cohort	4.5%					4.5%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	27					27
				% within cohort	24.5%					24.5%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	25					25
				% within cohort	22.7%					22.7%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	53					53
				% within cohort	48.2%					48.2%
		Total		Count	110					110
				% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
	1988.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	5	14				19
				% within cohort	7.8%	13.2%				11.2%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	14	23				37
				% within cohort	21.9%	21.7%				21.8%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	7	20				27
				% within cohort	10.9%	18.9%				15.9%

			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	38	49				87
				% within cohort	59.4%	46.2%				51.2%
		Total		Count	64	106				170
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
	1992.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	4	3	5			12
				% within cohort	4.2%	3.4%	3.7%			3.8%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	16	19	30			65
				% within cohort	16.7%	21.8%	22.2%			20.4%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	14	11	12			37
				% within cohort	14.6%	12.6%	8.9%			11.6%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	62	54	88			204
				% within cohort	64.6%	62.1%	65.2%			64.2%
		Total		Count	96	87	135			318
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
	1996.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	2	4	1	6		13
				% within cohort	3.2%	7.4%	2.0%	7.7%		5.3%
			2. The law should permit	Count	4	2	7	15		28

		abortion only in case of rape,	% within cohort	6.3%	3.7%	13.7%	19.2%		11.4%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	8	12	7	16		43
			% within cohort	12.7%	22.2%	13.7%	20.5%		17.5%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	49	36	36	41		162
			% within cohort	77.8%	66.7%	70.6%	52.6%		65.9%
	Total		Count	63	54	51	78		246
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	1	2	0	0	3	6
			% within cohort	4.3%	8.3%	.0%	.0%	7.1%	4.6%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	0	2	6	4	13	25
			% within cohort	.0%	8.3%	27.3%	20.0%	31.0%	19.1%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	5	3	1	6	6	21
			% within cohort	21.7%	12.5%	4.5%	30.0%	14.3%	16.0%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	17	17	15	10	20	79
			% within cohort	73.9%	70.8%	68.2%	50.0%	47.6%	60.3%
	Total		Count	23	24	22	20	42	131
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

	2004.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count		0		2	1	3
				% within cohort		.0%		4.1%	2.9%	2.8%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count		5		11	7	23
				% within cohort		21.7%		22.4%	20.0%	21.5%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count		2		6	4	12
				% within cohort		8.7%		12.2%	11.4%	11.2%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count		16		30	23	69
				% within cohort		69.6%		61.2%	65.7%	64.5%
		Total		Count		23		49	35	107
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
3. Moderate ('middle of the road')	1984.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	3					3
				% within cohort	3.0%					3.0%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	27					27
				% within cohort	27.3%					27.3%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	29					29
				% within cohort	29.3%					29.3%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	40					40
				% within cohort	40.4%					40.4%
		Total		Count	99					99
				% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%

	1988.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	0	3				3
				% within cohort	.0%	14.3%				8.8%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	2	6				8
				% within cohort	15.4%	28.6%				23.5%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	4	4				8
				% within cohort	30.8%	19.0%				23.5%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	7	8				15
				% within cohort	53.8%	38.1%				44.1%
		Total		Count	13	21				34
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
	1992.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	2	0	1			3
				% within cohort	14.3%	.0%	8.3%			7.1%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	3	7	5			15
				% within cohort	21.4%	43.8%	41.7%			35.7%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	0	1	1			2
				% within cohort	.0%	6.3%	8.3%			4.8%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	9	8	5			22
				% within cohort	64.3%	50.0%	41.7%			52.4%
		Total		Count	14	16	12			42

			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	2	2	1	2		7
			% within cohort	10.0%	12.5%	11.1%	14.3%		11.9%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	6	6	2	6		20
			% within cohort	30.0%	37.5%	22.2%	42.9%		33.9%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	1	2	2	1		6
			% within cohort	5.0%	12.5%	22.2%	7.1%		10.2%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	11	6	4	5		26
			% within cohort	55.0%	37.5%	44.4%	35.7%		44.1%
	Total		Count	20	16	9	14		59
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
			% within cohort	.0%	50.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	4.8%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	0	0	0	1	7	8
			% within cohort	.0%	.0%	.0%	16.7%	70.0%	38.1%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	1	0	0	0	1	2
			% within cohort	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	10.0%	9.5%
		4. By law, a woman should	Count	0	1	2	5	2	10

			always be able to obtain an	% within cohort	.0%	50.0%	100.0%	83.3%	20.0%	47.6%
		Total		Count	1	2	2	6	10	21
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	2004.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count		0		1	1	2
				% within cohort		.0%		16.7%	33.3%	16.7%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count		2		2	2	6
				% within cohort		66.7%		33.3%	66.7%	50.0%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count		0		2	0	2
				% within cohort		.0%		33.3%	.0%	16.7%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count		1		1	0	2
				% within cohort		33.3%		16.7%	.0%	16.7%
		Total		Count		3		6	3	12
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
5. Conservative	1984.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	29					29
				% within cohort	21.6%					21.6%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	44					44
				% within cohort	32.8%					32.8%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	22					22
				% within cohort	16.4%					16.4%

		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	39					39
			% within cohort	29.1%					29.1%
	Total		Count	134					134
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	11	13				24
			% within cohort	11.2%	10.6%				10.9%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	30	49				79
			% within cohort	30.6%	39.8%				35.7%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	23	18				41
			% within cohort	23.5%	14.6%				18.6%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	34	43				77
			% within cohort	34.7%	35.0%				34.8%
	Total		Count	98	123				221
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	14	7	18			39
			% within cohort	10.1%	6.1%	13.2%			10.0%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	50	39	44			133
			% within cohort	36.0%	33.9%	32.4%			34.1%
		3. The law should permit	Count	22	17	18			57

		abortion for reasons other than	% within cohort	15.8%	14.8%	13.2%			14.6%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	53	52	56			161
			% within cohort	38.1%	45.2%	41.2%			41.3%
	Total		Count	139	115	136			390
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	17	11	7	8		43
			% within cohort	16.8%	14.5%	12.7%	11.1%		14.1%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	37	23	19	26		105
			% within cohort	36.6%	30.3%	34.5%	36.1%		34.5%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	13	11	11	16		51
			% within cohort	12.9%	14.5%	20.0%	22.2%		16.8%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	34	31	18	22		105
			% within cohort	33.7%	40.8%	32.7%	30.6%		34.5%
	Total		Count	101	76	55	72		304
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	6	10	2	1	3	22
			% within cohort	10.7%	18.9%	4.9%	4.8%	11.1%	11.1%
		2. The law should permit	Count	22	12	15	11	10	70

			abortion only in case of rape,	% within cohort	39.3%	22.6%	36.6%	52.4%	37.0%	35.4%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	7	9	6	4	4	30
				% within cohort	12.5%	17.0%	14.6%	19.0%	14.8%	15.2%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	21	22	18	5	10	76
				% within cohort	37.5%	41.5%	43.9%	23.8%	37.0%	38.4%
		Total		Count	56	53	41	21	27	198
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	2004.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count		9		12	6	27
				% within cohort		19.1%		15.8%	20.0%	17.6%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count		13		20	7	40
				% within cohort		27.7%		26.3%	23.3%	26.1%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count		10		18	5	33
				% within cohort		21.3%		23.7%	16.7%	21.6%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count		15		26	12	53
				% within cohort		31.9%		34.2%	40.0%	34.6%
		Total		Count		47		76	30	153
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
6	1984.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	5					5
				% within cohort	16.1%					16.1%

			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	12					12
				% within cohort	38.7%					38.7%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	4					4
				% within cohort	12.9%					12.9%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	10					10
				% within cohort	32.3%					32.3%
		Total		Count	31					31
				% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
	1988.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	2	7				9
				% within cohort	10.5%	21.9%				17.6%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	7	11				18
				% within cohort	36.8%	34.4%				35.3%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	2	5				7
				% within cohort	10.5%	15.6%				13.7%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	8	9				17
				% within cohort	42.1%	28.1%				33.3%
		Total		Count	19	32				51
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
	1992.00	When Should Abortion Be	1. By law, abortion should	Count	2	2	7			11

	Allowed by	never be permitted	% within cohort	16.7%	15.4 %	25.9%			21.2%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	5	6	8			19
			% within cohort	41.7%	46.2 %	29.6%			36.5%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	2	2	3			7
			% within cohort	16.7%	15.4 %	11.1%			13.5%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	3	3	9			15
			% within cohort	25.0%	23.1 %	33.3%			28.8%
	Total		Count	12	13	27			52
			% within cohort	100.0 %	100. 0%	100.0 %			100.0 %
1996.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	0	2	0	4		6
			% within cohort	.0%	28.6 %	.0%	50.0 %		30.0%
		2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	1	1	1	3		6
			% within cohort	33.3%	14.3 %	50.0%	37.5 %		30.0%
		3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	0	2	0	0		2
			% within cohort	.0%	28.6 %	.0%	.0%		10.0%
		4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	2	2	1	1		6
			% within cohort	66.7%	28.6 %	50.0%	12.5 %		30.0%
	Total		Count	3	7	2	8		20

				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
	2000.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count	1	2	1	1	1	6
				% within cohort	50.0%	66.7%	14.3%	50.0%	9.1%	24.0%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count	0	0	3	1	3	7
				% within cohort	.0%	.0%	42.9%	50.0%	27.3%	28.0%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count	0	0	1	0	1	2
				% within cohort	.0%	.0%	14.3%	.0%	9.1%	8.0%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count	1	1	2	0	6	10
				% within cohort	50.0%	33.3%	28.6%	.0%	54.5%	40.0%
		Total		Count	2	3	7	2	11	25
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
7. Refuses to choose (in follow-up [exc. 1988 moderates])	2004.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	1. By law, abortion should never be permitted	Count		0		2	2	4
				% within cohort		.0%		50.0%	66.7%	44.4%
			2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count		1		1	0	2
				% within cohort		50.0%		25.0%	.0%	22.2%
			3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than	Count		0		0	1	1
				% within cohort		.0%		.0%	33.3%	11.1%
			4. By law, a woman should	Count		1		1	0	2

			always be able to obtain an	% within cohort		50.0%		25.0%	.0%	22.2%
		Total		Count		2		4	3	9
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
8	2004.00	When Should Abortion Be Allowed by	2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape,	Count				1		1
				% within cohort				50.0%		50.0%
			4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an	Count				1		1
				% within cohort				50.0%		50.0%
		Total		Count				2		2
				% within cohort				100.0%		100.0%

Table 8 Opinion on Affirmative Action

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1992	Affirmative Action Hiring and Promo	1. For	Count	50	43	67			160
			% within cohort	19.9%	20.2%	23.3%			21.3%
		5. Against	Count	196	166	208			570
			% within cohort	78.1%	77.9%	72.5%			75.9%
		8. DK;1990-	Count	5	4	12			21

		1994:refused;1996 and later: other	% within cohort	2.0%	1.9%	4.2%			2.8%
	Total		Count	251	213	287			751
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Affirmative Action Hiring and Promo	1. For	Count	23	20	15	24		82
			% within cohort	13.5%	14.6%	14.3%	18.6%		15.2%
		5. Against	Count	138	107	85	95		425
			% within cohort	81.2%	78.1%	81.0%	73.6%		78.6%
		8. DK;1990-1994:refused;1996 and later: other	Count	9	10	5	10		34
			% within cohort	5.3%	7.3%	4.8%	7.8%		6.3%
	Total		Count	170	137	105	129		541
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Affirmative Action Hiring and Promo	1. For	Count	21	18	18	11	55	123
			% within cohort	11.8%	10.5%	12.9%	10.0%	27.8%	15.4%
		5. Against	Count	144	137	108	92	130	611
			% within cohort	80.9%	79.7%	77.7%	83.6%	65.7%	76.7%
		8. DK;1990-1994:refused;1996 and later: other	Count	13	17	13	7	13	63
			% within cohort	7.3%	9.9%	9.4%	6.4%	6.6%	7.9%
	Total		Count	178	172	139	110	198	797
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Affirmative Action Hiring and Promo	1. For	Count		13		20	24	57
			% within cohort		17.6%		14.5%	32.4%	19.9%
		5. Against	Count		57		107	48	212
			% within cohort		77.0%		77.5%	64.9%	74.1%
		8. DK;1990-	Count		4		11	2	17

	1994:refused;1996 and later: other	% within cohort		5.4%		8.0%	2.7%	5.9%
	Total	Count		74		138	74	286
		% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 9 Opinions on Homosexuals Serving in the Military

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1992	R Favor/Oppose Gays in Military	1. Yes, think so	Count	153	124	161			438
			% within cohort	61.2%	59.9%	56.1%			58.9%
		5. Don't think so	Count	90	74	114			278
			% within cohort	36.0%	35.7%	39.7%			37.4%
		8. DK	Count	7	9	12			28
			% within cohort	2.8%	4.3%	4.2%			3.8%
	Total		Count	250	207	287			744
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	R Favor/Oppose Gays in Military	1. Yes, think so	Count	120	93	84	92		389
			% within cohort	70.2%	67.4%	79.2%	70.8%		71.4%
		5. Don't think so	Count	47	42	22	38		149
			% within cohort	27.5%	30.4%	20.8%	29.2%		27.3%
		8. DK	Count	4	3	0	0		7
			% within cohort	2.3%	2.2%	.0%	.0%		1.3%
	Total		Count	171	138	106	130		545
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%

2000	R Favor/Oppose Gays in Military	1. Yes, think so	Count	132	130	96	83	171	612
			% within cohort	73.7%	75.6%	69.6%	73.5%	85.9%	76.4%
		5. Don't think so	Count	41	35	36	27	22	161
			% within cohort	22.9%	20.3%	26.1%	23.9%	11.1%	20.1%
		8. DK	Count	6	7	6	3	6	28
			% within cohort	3.4%	4.1%	4.3%	2.7%	3.0%	3.5%
	Total		Count	179	172	138	113	199	801
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	R Favor/Oppose Gays in Military	1. Yes, think so	Count		59		117	62	238
			% within cohort		79.7%		86.7%	83.8%	84.1%
		5. Don't think so	Count		13		16	10	39
			% within cohort		17.6%		11.9%	13.5%	13.8%
		8. DK	Count		2		2	2	6
			% within cohort		2.7%		1.5%	2.7%	2.1%
	Total		Count		74		135	74	283
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 10 Opinion on Federal Welfare Spending

Year of Study				cohort					
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1992	Welfare Programs - Federal Spending	1. Increased	Count	49	45	69			163
			% within cohort	18.0%	19.0%	21.8%			19.8%
		2. Same	Count	89	80	128			297
			% within cohort	32.7%	33.8%	40.5%			36.0%

		3. Decreased or cut out entirely	Count	127	107	113			347
			% within cohort	46.7%	45.1%	35.8%			42.1%
		8. DK	Count	7	5	6			18
			% within cohort	2.6%	2.1%	1.9%			2.2%
	Total		Count	272	237	316			825
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Welfare Programs - Federal Spending	1. Increased	Count	17	19	15	32		83
			% within cohort	8.9%	12.0%	12.8%	18.5%		13.0%
		2. Same	Count	59	37	33	59		188
			% within cohort	31.1%	23.4%	28.2%	34.1%		29.5%
		3. Decreased or cut out entirely	Count	113	101	69	81		364
			% within cohort	59.5%	63.9%	59.0%	46.8%		57.1%
		8. DK	Count	1	1	0	1		3
			% within cohort	.5%	.6%	.0%	.6%		.5%
	Total		Count	190	158	117	173		638
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Welfare Programs - Federal Spending	1. Increased	Count	29	31	27	18	45	150
			% within cohort	16.2%	17.8%	19.4%	15.9%	22.5%	18.6%
		2. Same	Count	77	70	47	48	81	323
			% within cohort	43.0%	40.2%	33.8%	42.5%	40.5%	40.1%
		3. Decreased or cut out entirely	Count	71	72	65	45	72	325
			% within cohort	39.7%	41.4%	46.8%	39.8%	36.0%	40.4%
		8. DK	Count	2	1	0	2	2	7
			% within cohort	1.1%	.6%	.0%	1.8%	1.0%	.9%
	Total		Count	179	174	139	113	200	805
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Welfare Programs - Federal	1. Increased	Count		22		33	25	80

	Spending		% within cohort		25.0%		21.2%	29.1%	24.2%
		2. Same	Count		35		70	36	141
			% within cohort		39.8%		44.9%	41.9%	42.7%
		3. Decreased or cut out entirely	Count		31		53	25	109
			% within cohort		35.2%		34.0%	29.1%	33.0%
	Total		Count		88		156	86	330
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 11 Opinions on Federal Spending on Food Stamps

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1984	Food Stamps Spending - Federal Spend	1. Increased	Count	84					84
			% within cohort	25.2%					25.2%
		2. Same	Count	119					119
			% within cohort	35.7%					35.7%
		3. Decreased	Count	122					122
			% within cohort	36.6%					36.6%
		8. DK	Count	8					8
			% within cohort	2.4%					2.4%
	Total		Count	333					333
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Food Stamps Spending - Federal Spend	1. Increased	Count	47	71				118
			% within cohort	23.9%	24.7%				24.3%

		2. Same	Count	83	131				214
			% within cohort	42.1%	45.5%				44.1%
		3. Decreased	Count	61	81				142
			% within cohort	31.0%	28.1%				29.3%
		8. DK	Count	6	5				11
			% within cohort	3.0%	1.7%				2.3%
	Total		Count	197	288				485
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Food Stamps Spending - Federal Spend	1. Increased	Count	48	35	62			145
			% within cohort	17.6%	14.8%	19.6%			17.6%
		2. Same	Count	124	121	164			409
			% within cohort	45.6%	51.1%	51.9%			49.6%
		3. Decreased	Count	93	74	85			252
			% within cohort	34.2%	31.2%	26.9%			30.5%
		8. DK	Count	7	7	5			19
			% within cohort	2.6%	3.0%	1.6%			2.3%
	Total		Count	272	237	316			825
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Food Stamps Spending - Federal Spend	1. Increased	Count	21	21	10	21		73
			% within cohort	11.1%	13.3%	8.5%	12.1%		11.4%
		2. Same	Count	76	57	46	77		256
			% within cohort	40.0%	36.1%	39.3%	44.5%		40.1%
		3. Decreased	Count	93	78	60	74		305
			% within cohort	48.9%	49.4%	51.3%	42.8%		47.8%
		8. DK	Count	0	2	1	1		4
			% within cohort	.0%	1.3%	.9%	.6%		.6%
	Total		Count	190	158	117	173		638

			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Food Stamps Spending - Federal Spend	1. Increased	Count	28	21	32	20	32	133
			% within cohort	15.6%	12.1%	23.0%	17.9%	16.0%	16.5%
		2. Same	Count	96	88	57	49	103	393
			% within cohort	53.3%	50.6%	41.0%	43.8%	51.5%	48.8%
		3. Decreased	Count	50	58	47	41	61	257
			% within cohort	27.8%	33.3%	33.8%	36.6%	30.5%	31.9%
		7. Cut out entirely (volunteered)	Count	0	3	1	0	1	5
			% within cohort	.0%	1.7%	.7%	.0%	.5%	.6%
		8. DK	Count	6	4	2	2	3	17
			% within cohort	3.3%	2.3%	1.4%	1.8%	1.5%	2.1%
	Total		Count	180	174	139	112	200	805
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 12 Did Respondents Vote

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1984	Did R Register and Vote	1. Not registered, and did not vote	Count	109					109
			% within cohort	32.1%					32.1%
		2. Registered, but did not vote	Count	48					48
			% within cohort	14.1%					14.1%
		3. Voted (registered)	Count	183					183
			% within cohort	53.8%					53.8%

	Total		Count	340					340
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Did R Register and Vote	1. Not registered, and did not vote	Count	44	98				142
			% within cohort	27.2%	41.0%				35.4%
		2. Registered, but did not vote	Count	27	30				57
			% within cohort	16.7%	12.6%				14.2%
		3. Voted (registered)	Count	91	111				202
			% within cohort	56.2%	46.4%				50.4%
	Total		Count	162	239				401
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Did R Register and Vote	1. Not registered, and did not vote	Count	42	56	97			195
			% within cohort	16.7%	26.2%	33.8%			25.9%
		2. Registered, but did not vote	Count	21	12	26			59
			% within cohort	8.3%	5.6%	9.1%			7.8%
		3. Voted (registered)	Count	189	146	164			499
			% within cohort	75.0%	68.2%	57.1%			66.3%
	Total		Count	252	214	287			753
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Did R Register and Vote	1. Not registered, and did not vote	Count	20	24	15	26		85
			% within cohort	11.6%	17.3%	14.2%	19.8%		15.5%
		2. Registered, but did not vote	Count	27	17	20	33		97
			% within cohort	15.7%	12.2%	18.9%	25.2%		17.7%
		3. Voted (registered)	Count	125	98	71	72		366
			% within cohort	72.7%	70.5%	67.0%	55.0%		66.8%
	Total		Count	172	139	106	131		548
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Did R Register and Vote	1. Not registered, and did	Count	17	22	20	18	43	120

		not vote	% within cohort	11.5%	15.0%	17.7%	19.4%	26.9%	18.2%
		2. Registered, but did not vote	Count	21	13	12	13	29	88
			% within cohort	14.2%	8.8%	10.6%	14.0%	18.1%	13.3%
		3. Voted (registered)	Count	110	112	81	62	88	453
			% within cohort	74.3%	76.2%	71.7%	66.7%	55.0%	68.5%
	Total		Count	148	147	113	93	160	661
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Did R Register and Vote	1. Not registered, and did not vote	Count		9		16	6	31
			% within cohort		12.0%		11.6%	8.1%	10.8%
		2. Registered, but did not vote	Count		11		16	10	37
			% within cohort		14.7%		11.6%	13.5%	12.9%
		3. Voted (registered)	Count		55		106	58	219
			% within cohort		73.3%		76.8%	78.4%	76.3%
	Total		Count		75		138	74	287
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 13 Political Knowledge of Respondents

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1984	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	17					17
			% within cohort	4.4%					4.4%
		2. Fairly High	Count	76					76
			% within cohort	19.5%					19.5%
		3. Average	Count	146					146

			% within cohort	37.5%					37.5%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	107					107
			% within cohort	27.5%					27.5%
		5. Very Low	Count	43					43
			% within cohort	11.1%					11.1%
	Total		Count	389					389
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	14	17				31
			% within cohort	7.2%	5.9%				6.4%
		2. Fairly High	Count	42	55				97
			% within cohort	21.5%	19.1%				20.1%
		3. Average	Count	70	86				156
			% within cohort	35.9%	29.9%				32.3%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	41	84				125
			% within cohort	21.0%	29.2%				25.9%
		5. Very Low	Count	28	46				74
			% within cohort	14.4%	16.0%				15.3%
	Total		Count	195	288				483
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	43	24	21			88
			% within cohort	15.9%	10.1%	6.6%			10.7%
		2. Fairly High	Count	83	68	77			228
			% within cohort	30.6%	28.6%	24.4%			27.6%
		3. Average	Count	94	98	127			319
			% within cohort	34.7%	41.2%	40.2%			38.7%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	40	35	71			146
			% within cohort	14.8%	14.7%	22.5%			17.7%

		5. Very Low	Count	11	13	20			44
			% within cohort	4.1%	5.5%	6.3%			5.3%
	Total		Count	271	238	316			825
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	20	18	13	7		58
			% within cohort	10.9%	11.8%	11.2%	4.2%		9.4%
		2. Fairly High	Count	53	36	31	35		155
			% within cohort	29.0%	23.5%	26.7%	20.8%		25.0%
		3. Average	Count	71	51	47	67		236
			% within cohort	38.8%	33.3%	40.5%	39.9%		38.1%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	32	36	17	45		130
			% within cohort	17.5%	23.5%	14.7%	26.8%		21.0%
		5. Very Low	Count	7	12	8	14		41
			% within cohort	3.8%	7.8%	6.9%	8.3%		6.6%
	Total		Count	183	153	116	168		620
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	25	29	24	18	16	112
			% within cohort	14.0%	16.8%	17.4%	15.9%	8.0%	13.9%
		2. Fairly High	Count	43	46	39	22	31	181
			% within cohort	24.0%	26.6%	28.3%	19.5%	15.5%	22.5%
		3. Average	Count	67	61	40	38	64	270
			% within cohort	37.4%	35.3%	29.0%	33.6%	32.0%	33.6%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	35	25	28	30	62	180
			% within cohort	19.6%	14.5%	20.3%	26.5%	31.0%	22.4%
		5. Very Low	Count	9	12	7	5	27	60
			% within cohort	5.0%	6.9%	5.1%	4.4%	13.5%	7.5%
	Total		Count	179	173	138	113	200	803

			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count		17		30	13	60
			% within cohort		19.1%		19.7%	16.0%	18.6%
		2. Fairly High	Count		20		46	23	89
			% within cohort		22.5%		30.3%	28.4%	27.6%
		3. Average	Count		32		48	30	110
			% within cohort		36.0%		31.6%	37.0%	34.2%
		4. Fairly Low	Count		13		21	12	46
			% within cohort		14.6%		13.8%	14.8%	14.3%
		5. Very Low	Count		7		7	3	17
			% within cohort		7.9%		4.6%	3.7%	5.3%
	Total		Count		89		152	81	322
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 14 Political Knowledge of Respondents with Education Acting as a Control

R Education 4-category	Year of Study				cohort					
					1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1. Grade school or less (0-8 grades)	1984	Pre - R Level of Political Info	4. Fairly Low	Count	5					5
				% within cohort	62.5 %					62.5 %
			5. Very Low	Count	3					3
				% within cohort	37.5 %					37.5 %
		Total		Count	8					8

			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Pre - R Level of Political Info	3. Average	Count	1	0				1
			% within cohort	33.3%	.0%				16.7%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	2	1				3
			% within cohort	66.7%	33.3%				50.0%
		5. Very Low	Count	0	2				2
			% within cohort	.0%	66.7%				33.3%
	Total		Count	3	3				6
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Pre - R Level of Political Info	3. Average	Count	0	0	2			2
			% within cohort	.0%	.0%	66.7%			25.0%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	2	2	1			5
			% within cohort	100.0%	66.7%	33.3%			62.5%
		5. Very Low	Count	0	1	0			1
			% within cohort	.0%	33.3%	.0%			12.5%
	Total		Count	2	3	3			8
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%

	1996	Pre - R Level of Political Info	3. Average	Count	0	1				1
				% within cohort	.0%	50.0%				33.3%
			4. Fairly Low	Count	1	1				2
				% within cohort	100.0%	50.0%				66.7%
		Total		Count	1	2				3
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
	2000	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	0	0	1			1
				% within cohort	.0%	.0%	50.0%			14.3%
			3. Average	Count	0	1	1			2
				% within cohort	.0%	33.3%	50.0%			28.6%
			4. Fairly Low	Count	1	0	0			1
				% within cohort	50.0%	.0%	.0%			14.3%
			5. Very Low	Count	1	2	0			3
				% within cohort	50.0%	66.7%	.0%			42.9%
		Total		Count	2	3	2			7
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
	2004	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count		1		0		1

			% within cohort		50.0%		.0%		25.0%
		3. Average	Count		1		0		1
			% within cohort		50.0%		.0%		25.0%
		5. Very Low	Count		0		2		2
			% within cohort		.0%		100.0%		50.0%
	Total		Count		2		2		4
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
2. High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college	1984	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	1				1
				% within cohort	.5%				.5%
			2. Fairly High	Count	25				25
				% within cohort	11.7%				11.7%
			3. Average	Count	83				83
				% within cohort	39.0%				39.0%
			4. Fairly Low	Count	71				71
				% within cohort	33.3%				33.3%
			5. Very Low	Count	33				33
				% within cohort	15.5%				15.5%
		Total		Count	213				213

			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	3	2				5
			% within cohort	2.9%	1.2%				1.8%
		2. Fairly High	Count	16	16				32
			% within cohort	15.2%	9.4%				11.6%
		3. Average	Count	36	51				87
			% within cohort	34.3%	29.8%				31.5%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	28	63				91
			% within cohort	26.7%	36.8%				33.0%
		5. Very Low	Count	22	39				61
			% within cohort	21.0%	22.8%				22.1%
	Total		Count	105	171				276
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	7	3	6			16
			% within cohort	6.3%	2.9%	3.6%			4.2%
		2. Fairly High	Count	24	19	29			72
			% within cohort	21.6%	18.3%	17.3%			18.8%
		3. Average	Count	47	46	60			153
			% within cohort	42.3%	44.2%	35.7%			39.9%

		4. Fairly Low	Count	23	26	54			103
			% within cohort	20.7 %	25.0 %	32.1 %			26.9 %
		5. Very Low	Count	10	10	19			39
			% within cohort	9.0%	9.6%	11.3 %			10.2 %
	Total		Count	111	104	168			383
			% within cohort	100.0 %	100.0 %	100. 0%			100.0 %
1996	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	2	3	0	0		5
			% within cohort	3.1%	4.5%	.0%	.0%		2.1%
		2. Fairly High	Count	10	5	2	8		25
			% within cohort	15.6 %	7.5%	5.7 %	11.4 %		10.6 %
		3. Average	Count	24	25	19	21		89
			% within cohort	37.5 %	37.3 %	54.3 %	30.0 %		37.7 %
		4. Fairly Low	Count	21	24	10	28		83
			% within cohort	32.8 %	35.8 %	28.6 %	40.0 %		35.2 %
		5. Very Low	Count	7	10	4	13		34
			% within cohort	10.9 %	14.9 %	11.4 %	18.6 %		14.4 %
	Total		Count	64	67	35	70		236
			% within cohort	100.0 %	100.0 %	100. 0%	100.0 %		100.0 %
2000	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	6	0	6	1	7	20

			% within cohort	10.7%	.0%	14.3%	3.1%	8.1%	7.4%
		2. Fairly High	Count	4	12	7	2	6	31
			% within cohort	7.1%	21.4%	16.7%	6.3%	7.0%	11.4%
		3. Average	Count	22	21	13	5	16	77
			% within cohort	39.3%	37.5%	31.0%	15.6%	18.6%	28.3%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	19	17	13	19	42	110
			% within cohort	33.9%	30.4%	31.0%	59.4%	48.8%	40.4%
		5. Very Low	Count	5	6	3	5	15	34
			% within cohort	8.9%	10.7%	7.1%	15.6%	17.4%	12.5%
	Total		Count	56	56	42	32	86	272
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count		2		6	1	9
			% within cohort		6.9%		15.0%	5.0%	10.1%
		2. Fairly High	Count		7		7	3	17
			% within cohort		24.1%		17.5%	15.0%	19.1%
		3. Average	Count		11		14	8	33
			% within cohort		37.9%		35.0%	40.0%	37.1%
		4. Fairly Low	Count		7		9	6	22

				% within cohort		24.1%		22.5%	30.0%	24.7%
			5. Very Low	Count		2		4	2	8
				% within cohort		6.9%		10.0%	10.0%	9.0%
		Total		Count		29		40	20	89
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
3. Some college(13 grades or more, but no degree;1984	1984	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	10					10
				% within cohort	8.0%					8.0%
			2. Fairly High	Count	32					32
				% within cohort	25.6%					25.6%
			3. Average	Count	48					48
				% within cohort	38.4%					38.4%
			4. Fairly Low	Count	28					28
				% within cohort	22.4%					22.4%
			5. Very Low	Count	7					7
				% within cohort	5.6%					5.6%
		Total		Count	125					125
				% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
	1988	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	3	5				8
				% within cohort	7.0%	6.3%				6.6%
			2. Fairly High	Count	6	27				33

			% within cohort	14.0%	34.2%				27.0%
		3. Average	Count	20	24				44
			% within cohort	46.5%	30.4%				36.1%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	10	18				28
			% within cohort	23.3%	22.8%				23.0%
		5. Very Low	Count	4	5				9
			% within cohort	9.3%	6.3%				7.4%
	Total		Count	43	79				122
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	13	4	9			26
			% within cohort	15.3%	5.8%	8.7%			10.1%
		2. Fairly High	Count	35	29	30			94
			% within cohort	41.2%	42.0%	29.1%			36.6%
		3. Average	Count	28	30	49			107
			% within cohort	32.9%	43.5%	47.6%			41.6%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	9	4	14			27
			% within cohort	10.6%	5.8%	13.6%			10.5%
		5. Very Low	Count	0	2	1			3
			% within cohort	.0%	2.9%	1.0%			1.2%

	Total		Count	85	69	103			257
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	5	2	2	3		12
			% within cohort	8.1%	4.3%	5.9%	4.3%		5.7%
		2. Fairly High	Count	15	21	8	16		60
			% within cohort	24.2%	45.7%	23.5%	22.9%		28.3%
		3. Average	Count	33	16	17	38		104
			% within cohort	53.2%	34.8%	50.0%	54.3%		49.1%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	9	6	5	13		33
			% within cohort	14.5%	13.0%	14.7%	18.6%		15.6%
		5. Very Low	Count	0	1	2	0		3
			% within cohort	.0%	2.2%	5.9%	.0%		1.4%
	Total		Count	62	46	34	70		212
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	5	9	3	2	3	22
			% within cohort	8.3%	15.5%	7.7%	5.9%	3.8%	8.2%
		2. Fairly High	Count	15	15	13	6	14	63
			% within cohort	25.0%	25.9%	33.3%	17.6%	17.9%	23.4%
		3. Average	Count	28	26	10	19	32	115

			% within cohort	46.7%	44.8%	25.6%	55.9%	41.0%	42.8%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	11	4	10	7	18	50
			% within cohort	18.3%	6.9%	25.6%	20.6%	23.1%	18.6%
		5. Very Low	Count	1	4	3	0	11	19
			% within cohort	1.7%	6.9%	7.7%	.0%	14.1%	7.1%
	Total		Count	60	58	39	34	78	269
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count		3		8	3	14
			% within cohort		11.5%		15.1%	9.7%	12.7%
		2. Fairly High	Count		3		15	10	28
			% within cohort		11.5%		28.3%	32.3%	25.5%
		3. Average	Count		11		20	13	44
			% within cohort		42.3%		37.7%	41.9%	40.0%
		4. Fairly Low	Count		4		9	4	17
			% within cohort		15.4%		17.0%	12.9%	15.5%
		5. Very Low	Count		5		1	1	7
			% within cohort		19.2%		1.9%	3.2%	6.4%
	Total		Count		26		53	31	110

				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
4. College or advanced degree (no cases 1948)	1984	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	6					6
				% within cohort	14.0%					14.0%
			2. Fairly High	Count	19					19
				% within cohort	44.2%					44.2%
			3. Average	Count	15					15
				% within cohort	34.9%					34.9%
			4. Fairly Low	Count	3					3
				% within cohort	7.0%					7.0%
		Total		Count	43					43
				% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
	1988	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	7	10				17
				% within cohort	17.9%	34.5%				25.0%
			2. Fairly High	Count	20	10				30
				% within cohort	51.3%	34.5%				44.1%
			3. Average	Count	9	8				17
				% within cohort	23.1%	27.6%				25.0%
			4. Fairly Low	Count	1	1				2

			% within cohort	2.6%	3.4%				2.9%
		5. Very Low	Count	2	0				2
			% within cohort	5.1%	.0%				2.9%
	Total		Count	39	29				68
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	22	16	6			44
			% within cohort	34.4%	27.6%	16.7%			27.8%
		2. Fairly High	Count	23	19	16			58
			% within cohort	35.9%	32.8%	44.4%			36.7%
		3. Average	Count	16	21	12			49
			% within cohort	25.0%	36.2%	33.3%			31.0%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	3	2	2			7
			% within cohort	4.7%	3.4%	5.6%			4.4%
	Total		Count	64	58	36			158
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	13	13	11	4		41
			% within cohort	23.2%	34.2%	23.4%	14.3%		24.3%
		2. Fairly High	Count	28	10	21	11		70

			% within cohort	50.0%	26.3%	44.7%	39.3%		41.4%
		3. Average	Count	14	9	11	8		42
			% within cohort	25.0%	23.7%	23.4%	28.6%		24.9%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	1	5	2	4		12
			% within cohort	1.8%	13.2%	4.3%	14.3%		7.1%
		5. Very Low	Count	0	1	2	1		4
			% within cohort	.0%	2.6%	4.3%	3.6%		2.4%
	Total		Count	56	38	47	28		169
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count	14	20	14	15	6	69
			% within cohort	23.0%	35.7%	25.5%	32.6%	16.7%	27.2%
		2. Fairly High	Count	24	19	19	14	11	87
			% within cohort	39.3%	33.9%	34.5%	30.4%	30.6%	34.3%
		3. Average	Count	17	13	16	13	16	75
			% within cohort	27.9%	23.2%	29.1%	28.3%	44.4%	29.5%
		4. Fairly Low	Count	4	4	5	4	2	19
			% within cohort	6.6%	7.1%	9.1%	8.7%	5.6%	7.5%

		5. Very Low	Count	2	0	1	0	1	4
			% within cohort	3.3%	.0%	1.8%	.0%	2.8%	1.6%
	Total		Count	61	56	55	46	36	254
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Pre - R Level of Political Info	1. Very High	Count		11		16	9	36
			% within cohort		34.4%		28.1%	30.0%	30.3%
		2. Fairly High	Count		10		24	10	44
			% within cohort		31.3%		42.1%	33.3%	37.0%
		3. Average	Count		9		14	9	32
			% within cohort		28.1%		24.6%	30.0%	26.9%
		4. Fairly Low	Count		2		3	2	7
			% within cohort		6.3%		5.3%	6.7%	5.9%
	Total		Count		32		57	30	119
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 15 Interest in Public Affairs

Year of Study	cohort					
	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total

1984	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	63					63
			% within cohort	19.0%					19.0%
		2. Only now and then	Count	101					101
			% within cohort	30.5%					30.5%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	110					110
			% within cohort	33.2%					33.2%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	57					57
			% within cohort	17.2%					17.2%
	Total		Count	331					331
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	34	55				89
			% within cohort	21.5%	23.3%				22.6%
		2. Only now and then	Count	47	73				120
			% within cohort	29.7%	30.9%				30.5%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	53	75				128
			% within cohort	33.5%	31.8%				32.5%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	24	32				56
			% within cohort	15.2%	13.6%				14.2%
		9. DK	Count	0	1				1
			% within cohort	.0%	.4%				.3%
	Total		Count	158	236				394
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	24	28	45			97
			% within cohort	9.6%	13.1%	15.7%			12.9%
		2. Only now and then	Count	58	58	80			196
			% within cohort	23.2%	27.1%	27.9%			26.1%

		3. Some of the time	Count	116	91	121			328
		(1960,1962: fairly closely)	% within cohort	46.4%	42.5%	42.2%			43.7%
		4. Most of the time	Count	50	37	40			127
		(1960,1962: very closely)	% within cohort	20.0%	17.3%	13.9%			16.9%
		9. DK	Count	2	0	1			3
			% within cohort	.8%	.0%	.3%			.4%
	Total		Count	250	214	287			751
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962:	Count	26	27	18	25		96
		not much at all)	% within cohort	15.1%	19.4%	16.8%	19.1%		17.5%
		2. Only now and then	Count	47	50	34	45		176
			% within cohort	27.3%	36.0%	31.8%	34.4%		32.1%
		3. Some of the time	Count	71	38	39	43		191
		(1960,1962: fairly closely)	% within cohort	41.3%	27.3%	36.4%	32.8%		34.8%
		4. Most of the time	Count	28	24	16	18		86
		(1960,1962: very closely)	% within cohort	16.3%	17.3%	15.0%	13.7%		15.7%
	Total		Count	172	139	107	131		549
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962:	Count	24	16	19	17	41	117
		not much at all)	% within cohort	16.3%	10.8%	17.0%	17.9%	25.8%	17.7%
		2. Only now and then	Count	36	53	37	31	67	224
			% within cohort	24.5%	35.8%	33.0%	32.6%	42.1%	33.9%
		3. Some of the time	Count	61	50	40	33	39	223
		(1960,1962: fairly closely)	% within cohort	41.5%	33.8%	35.7%	34.7%	24.5%	33.7%
		4. Most of the time	Count	26	29	16	14	12	97
		(1960,1962: very closely)	% within cohort	17.7%	19.6%	14.3%	14.7%	7.5%	14.7%
	Total		Count	147	148	112	95	159	661

			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count		8		13	7	28
			% within cohort		10.7%		9.4%	9.5%	9.8%
		2. Only now and then	Count		19		46	24	89
			% within cohort		25.3%		33.3%	32.4%	31.0%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count		28		55	25	108
			% within cohort		37.3%		39.9%	33.8%	37.6%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count		20		23	18	61
			% within cohort		26.7%		16.7%	24.3%	21.3%
		9. DK	Count		0		1	0	1
			% within cohort		.0%		.7%	.0%	.3%
	Total		Count		75		138	74	287
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 16 Interest in Public Affairs with Education Acting as a Control

R Education 4-category	Year of Study				cohort					
					1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1. Grade school or less (0-8 grades)	1984	R Interest Public Affairs	2. Only now and then	Count	3					3
				% within cohort	75.0%					75.0%
			4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	1					1
				% within cohort	25.0%					25.0%
		Total		Count	4					4

			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	1	3				4
			% within cohort	50.0%	100.0%				80.0%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	1	0				1
			% within cohort	50.0%	.0%				20.0%
	Total		Count	2	3				5
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	1	2	2			5
			% within cohort	100.0%	66.7%	66.7%			71.4%
		2. Only now and then	Count	0	1	0			1
			% within cohort	.0%	33.3%	.0%			14.3%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	0	0	1			1
			% within cohort	.0%	.0%	33.3%			14.3%
	Total		Count	1	3	3			7
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	1	1				2
			% within cohort	100.0%	50.0%				66.7%

			2. Only now and then	Count	0	1				1
				% within cohort	.0%	50.0%				33.3%
		Total		Count	1	2				3
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
	2000	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	2	1	0			3
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	.0%			75.0%
			3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	0	0	1			1
				% within cohort	.0%	.0%	100.0%			25.0%
		Total		Count	2	1	1			4
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
	2004	R Interest Public Affairs	2. Only now and then	Count		1		1		2
				% within cohort		50.0%		100.0%		66.7%
			3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count		1		0		1
				% within cohort		50.0%		.0%		33.3%
		Total		Count		2		1		3
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
2. High school (12 grades or fewer, incl. non-college	1984	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	53					53
				% within cohort	28.6%					28.6%

		2. Only now and then	Count	52					52
			% within cohort	28.1%					28.1%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	61					61
			% within cohort	33.0%					33.0%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	19					19
			% within cohort	10.3%					10.3%
	Total		Count	185					185
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	24	39				63
			% within cohort	30.0%	28.1%				28.8%
		2. Only now and then	Count	28	45				73
			% within cohort	35.0%	32.4%				33.3%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	22	42				64
			% within cohort	27.5%	30.2%				29.2%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	6	12				18
			% within cohort	7.5%	8.6%				8.2%
		9. DK	Count	0	1				1
			% within cohort	.0%	.7%				.5%
	Total		Count	80	139				219

			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	16	20	34			70
			% within cohort	16.2%	21.7%	22.1%			20.3%
		2. Only now and then	Count	31	33	43			107
			% within cohort	31.3%	35.9%	27.9%			31.0%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	41	34	59			134
			% within cohort	41.4%	37.0%	38.3%			38.8%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	9	5	17			31
			% within cohort	9.1%	5.4%	11.0%			9.0%
		9. DK	Count	2	0	1			3
			% within cohort	2.0%	.0%	.6%			.9%
	Total		Count	99	92	154			345
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	12	17	6	15		50
			% within cohort	20.3%	28.8%	18.8%	32.6%		25.5%
		2. Only now and then	Count	11	20	14	14		59
			% within cohort	18.6%	33.9%	43.8%	30.4%		30.1%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	28	14	11	12		65
			% within cohort	47.5%	23.7%	34.4%	26.1%		33.2%

		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	8	8	1	5		22
			% within cohort	13.6%	13.6%	3.1%	10.9%		11.2%
	Total		Count	59	59	32	46		196
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	13	11	8	5	23	60
			% within cohort	26.5%	24.4%	24.2%	20.8%	33.3%	27.3%
		2. Only now and then	Count	16	21	15	10	26	88
			% within cohort	32.7%	46.7%	45.5%	41.7%	37.7%	40.0%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	16	9	8	5	16	54
			% within cohort	32.7%	20.0%	24.2%	20.8%	23.2%	24.5%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	4	4	2	4	4	18
			% within cohort	8.2%	8.9%	6.1%	16.7%	5.8%	8.2%
	Total		Count	49	45	33	24	69	220
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count		4		8	4	16
			% within cohort		16.0%		22.9%	22.2%	20.5%
		2. Only now and then	Count		5		14	7	26
			% within cohort		20.0%		40.0%	38.9%	33.3%
		3. Some of the time	Count		8		9	5	22

			(1960,1962: fairly closely)	% within cohort		32.0%		25.7%	27.8%	28.2%
			4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count		8		3	2	13
				% within cohort		32.0%		8.6%	11.1%	16.7%
			9. DK	Count		0		1	0	1
				% within cohort		.0%		2.9%	.0%	1.3%
		Total		Count		25		35	18	78
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
3. Some college(13 grades or more, but no degree;1984	1984	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	9					9
				% within cohort	8.5%					8.5%
			2. Only now and then	Count	39					39
				% within cohort	36.8%					36.8%
			3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	36					36
				% within cohort	34.0%					34.0%
			4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	22					22
				% within cohort	20.8%					20.8%
		Total		Count	106					106
				% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
	1988	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	8	12				20
				% within cohort	21.6%	18.5%				19.6%

			2. Only now and then	Count	10	19				29
				% within cohort	27.0%	29.2%				28.4%
			3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	14	25				39
				% within cohort	37.8%	38.5%				38.2%
			4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	5	9				14
				% within cohort	13.5%	13.8%				13.7%
		Total		Count	37	65				102
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
	1992	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	2	4	8			14
				% within cohort	2.5%	6.3%	8.6%			6.0%
			2. Only now and then	Count	16	15	27			58
				% within cohort	20.3%	23.8%	29.0%			24.7%
			3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	36	33	46			115
				% within cohort	45.6%	52.4%	49.5%			48.9%
			4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	25	11	12			48
				% within cohort	31.6%	17.5%	12.9%			20.4%
		Total		Count	79	63	93			235
				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
	1996	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962:	Count	10	5	7	7		29

		not much at all)	% within cohort	16.7%	11.9%	22.6%	11.7%		15.0%
		2. Only now and then	Count	20	17	9	24		70
			% within cohort	33.3%	40.5%	29.0%	40.0%		36.3%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	23	12	12	26		73
			% within cohort	38.3%	28.6%	38.7%	43.3%		37.8%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	7	8	3	3		21
			% within cohort	11.7%	19.0%	9.7%	5.0%		10.9%
	Total		Count	60	42	31	60		193
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	5	3	5	8	13	34
			% within cohort	10.4%	5.9%	15.6%	27.6%	21.7%	15.5%
		2. Only now and then	Count	14	19	13	10	29	85
			% within cohort	29.2%	37.3%	40.6%	34.5%	48.3%	38.6%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	21	18	12	10	15	76
			% within cohort	43.8%	35.3%	37.5%	34.5%	25.0%	34.5%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	8	11	2	1	3	25
			% within cohort	16.7%	21.6%	6.3%	3.4%	5.0%	11.4%
	Total		Count	48	51	32	29	60	220

				% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	2004	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count		4		3	3	10
				% within cohort		20.0%		6.3%	9.7%	10.1%
			2. Only now and then	Count		4		20	10	34
				% within cohort		20.0%		41.7%	32.3%	34.3%
			3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count		9		20	10	39
				% within cohort		45.0%		41.7%	32.3%	39.4%
			4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count		3		5	8	16
				% within cohort		15.0%		10.4%	25.8%	16.2%
		Total		Count		20		48	31	99
				% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
4. College or advanced degree (no cases 1948)	1984	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	1					1
				% within cohort	2.8%					2.8%
			2. Only now and then	Count	7					7
				% within cohort	19.4%					19.4%
			3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	13					13
				% within cohort	36.1%					36.1%
			4. Most of the time	Count	15					15

		(1960,1962: very closely)	% within cohort	41.7%					41.7%
	Total		Count	36					36
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	1	0				1
			% within cohort	2.9%	.0%				1.7%
		2. Only now and then	Count	8	6				14
			% within cohort	22.9%	24.0%				23.3%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	14	8				22
			% within cohort	40.0%	32.0%				36.7%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	12	11				23
			% within cohort	34.3%	44.0%				38.3%
	Total		Count	35	25				60
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	4	0	1			5
			% within cohort	6.3%	.0%	3.1%			3.4%
		2. Only now and then	Count	10	9	7			26
			% within cohort	15.9%	17.0%	21.9%			17.6%
		3. Some of the time	Count	34	24	15			73

		(1960,1962: fairly closely)	% within cohort	54.0%	45.3%	46.9%			49.3%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	15	20	9			44
			% within cohort	23.8%	37.7%	28.1%			29.7%
	Total		Count	63	53	32			148
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	3	4	5	3		15
			% within cohort	5.8%	11.1%	11.4%	12.0%		9.6%
		2. Only now and then	Count	16	12	11	7		46
			% within cohort	30.8%	33.3%	25.0%	28.0%		29.3%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	20	12	16	5		53
			% within cohort	38.5%	33.3%	36.4%	20.0%		33.8%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	13	8	12	10		43
			% within cohort	25.0%	22.2%	27.3%	40.0%		27.4%
	Total		Count	52	36	44	25		157
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count	4	1	6	3	5	19
			% within cohort	8.3%	2.0%	13.0%	7.3%	16.7%	8.8%

		2. Only now and then	Count	6	13	9	11	12	51
			% within cohort	12.5%	25.5%	19.6%	26.8%	40.0%	23.6%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count	24	23	19	18	8	92
			% within cohort	50.0%	45.1%	41.3%	43.9%	26.7%	42.6%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count	14	14	12	9	5	54
			% within cohort	29.2%	27.5%	26.1%	22.0%	16.7%	25.0%
	Total		Count	48	51	46	41	30	216
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	R Interest Public Affairs	1. Hardly at all (1960,1962: not much at all)	Count		0		2	0	2
			% within cohort		.0%		3.7%	.0%	1.9%
		2. Only now and then	Count		9		11	7	27
			% within cohort		32.1%		20.4%	28.0%	25.2%
		3. Some of the time (1960,1962: fairly closely)	Count		10		26	10	46
			% within cohort		35.7%		48.1%	40.0%	43.0%
		4. Most of the time (1960,1962: very closely)	Count		9		15	8	32
			% within cohort		32.1%		27.8%	32.0%	29.9%
	Total		Count		28		54	25	107
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 17 Opinions on the World Standing of the United States

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1984	Is Position of the U.S. Weaker/Stro	1. Weaker (1958,1960,1964,1968: less strong)	Count	67					67
			% within cohort	17.3%					17.3%
		3. Same	Count	172					172
			% within cohort	44.4%					44.4%
		5. Stronger	Count	137					137
			% within cohort	35.4%					35.4%
		8. DK	Count	11					11
			% within cohort	2.8%					2.8%
	Total		Count	387					387
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	Is Position of the U.S. Weaker/Stro	1. Weaker (1958,1960,1964,1968: less strong)	Count	70	95				165
			% within cohort	35.5%	32.9%				34.0%
		3. Same	Count	73	109				182
			% within cohort	37.1%	37.7%				37.4%
		5. Stronger	Count	47	80				127
			% within cohort	23.9%	27.7%				26.1%
		8. DK	Count	7	5				12
			% within cohort	3.6%	1.7%				2.5%
	Total		Count	197	289				486
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%

1992	Is Position of the U.S. Weaker/Stro	1. Weaker (1958,1960,1964,1968: less strong)	Count	74	73	105			252
			% within cohort	27.4%	30.7%	33.2%			30.6%
		3. Same	Count	98	91	112			301
			% within cohort	36.3%	38.2%	35.4%			36.5%
		5. Stronger	Count	95	70	93			258
			% within cohort	35.2%	29.4%	29.4%			31.3%
		8. DK	Count	3	4	6			13
			% within cohort	1.1%	1.7%	1.9%			1.6%
	Total		Count	270	238	316			824
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	Is Position of the U.S. Weaker/Stro	1. Weaker (1958,1960,1964,1968: less strong)	Count	48	43	37	42		170
			% within cohort	25.3%	27.2%	31.4%	24.3%		26.6%
		3. Same	Count	98	74	50	80		302
			% within cohort	51.6%	46.8%	42.4%	46.2%		47.3%
		5. Stronger	Count	42	40	30	47		159
			% within cohort	22.1%	25.3%	25.4%	27.2%		24.9%
		8. DK	Count	2	1	1	4		8
			% within cohort	1.1%	.6%	.8%	2.3%		1.3%
	Total		Count	190	158	118	173		639
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	Is Position of the U.S. Weaker/Stro	1. Weaker (1958,1960,1964,1968: less strong)	Count	59	55	41	28	32	215
			% within cohort	32.8%	31.6%	29.5%	24.8%	16.1%	26.7%
		3. Same	Count	82	79	80	60	96	397
			% within cohort	45.6%	45.4%	57.6%	53.1%	48.2%	49.3%

		5. Stronger	Count	37	38	17	23	67	182
			% within cohort	20.6%	21.8%	12.2%	20.4%	33.7%	22.6%
		8. DK	Count	2	2	1	2	4	11
			% within cohort	1.1%	1.1%	.7%	1.8%	2.0%	1.4%
	Total		Count	180	174	139	113	199	805
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	Is Position of the U.S. Weaker/Stro	1. Weaker (1958,1960,1964,1968: less strong)	Count		34		72	52	158
			% within cohort		38.6%		45.9%	61.2%	47.9%
		3. Same	Count		32		47	21	100
			% within cohort		36.4%		29.9%	24.7%	30.3%
		5. Stronger	Count		22		36	12	70
			% within cohort		25.0%		22.9%	14.1%	21.2%
		8. DK	Count		0		2	0	2
			% within cohort		.0%		1.3%	.0%	.6%
	Total		Count		88		157	85	330
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 18 Data on Newspaper Readership

Year of Study				cohort					
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1984	How Often R Read Newspaper in Last	0. None	Count	120					120
			% within cohort	30.8%					30.8%
		1. One day	Count	62					62

			% within cohort	15.9%					15.9%
		2	Count	41					41
			% within cohort	10.5%					10.5%
		3	Count	38					38
			% within cohort	9.8%					9.8%
		4	Count	30					30
			% within cohort	7.7%					7.7%
		5	Count	21					21
			% within cohort	5.4%					5.4%
		6	Count	10					10
			% within cohort	2.6%					2.6%
		7. Every day	Count	67					67
			% within cohort	17.2%					17.2%
	Total		Count	389					389
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	How Often R Read Newspaper in Last	0. None	Count	44	92				136
			% within cohort	22.4%	31.8%				28.0%
		1. One day	Count	28	42				70
			% within cohort	14.3%	14.5%				14.4%
		2	Count	25	29				54
			% within cohort	12.8%	10.0%				11.1%
		3	Count	19	22				41
			% within cohort	9.7%	7.6%				8.5%
		4	Count	6	20				26
			% within cohort	3.1%	6.9%				5.4%
		5	Count	12	11				23

			% within cohort	6.1%	3.8%				4.7%
		6	Count	4	5				9
			% within cohort	2.0%	1.7%				1.9%
		7. Every day	Count	58	68				126
			% within cohort	29.6%	23.5%				26.0%
	Total		Count	196	289				485
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	How Often R Read Newspaper in Last	0. None	Count	66	63	101			230
			% within cohort	26.0%	29.3%	35.8%			30.6%
		1. One day	Count	39	35	49			123
			% within cohort	15.4%	16.3%	17.4%			16.4%
		2	Count	33	19	32			84
			% within cohort	13.0%	8.8%	11.3%			11.2%
		3	Count	17	25	28			70
			% within cohort	6.7%	11.6%	9.9%			9.3%
		4	Count	14	20	12			46
			% within cohort	5.5%	9.3%	4.3%			6.1%
		5	Count	9	12	9			30
			% within cohort	3.5%	5.6%	3.2%			4.0%
		6	Count	5	2	3			10
			% within cohort	2.0%	.9%	1.1%			1.3%
		7. Every day	Count	71	39	48			158
			% within cohort	28.0%	18.1%	17.0%			21.0%
	Total		Count	254	215	282			751
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	How Often R Read Newspaper in Last	0. None	Count	46	44	41	52		183
			% within cohort	24.2%	27.8%	34.7%	30.1%		28.6%

		1. One day	Count	36	34	20	33		123
			% within cohort	18.9%	21.5%	16.9%	19.1%		19.2%
		2	Count	24	18	14	25		81
			% within cohort	12.6%	11.4%	11.9%	14.5%		12.7%
		3	Count	10	14	13	17		54
			% within cohort	5.3%	8.9%	11.0%	9.8%		8.5%
		4	Count	18	11	9	12		50
			% within cohort	9.5%	7.0%	7.6%	6.9%		7.8%
		5	Count	8	11	4	9		32
			% within cohort	4.2%	7.0%	3.4%	5.2%		5.0%
		6	Count	5	1	6	3		15
			% within cohort	2.6%	.6%	5.1%	1.7%		2.3%
		7. Every day	Count	43	25	11	22		101
			% within cohort	22.6%	15.8%	9.3%	12.7%		15.8%
	Total		Count	190	158	118	173		639
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	How Often R Read Newspaper in Last	0. None	Count	55	57	42	41	67	262
			% within cohort	30.6%	32.8%	30.2%	36.3%	33.5%	32.5%
		1. One day	Count	18	26	22	15	34	115
			% within cohort	10.0%	14.9%	15.8%	13.3%	17.0%	14.3%
		2	Count	20	14	24	18	26	102
			% within cohort	11.1%	8.0%	17.3%	15.9%	13.0%	12.7%
		3	Count	24	12	12	10	18	76
			% within cohort	13.3%	6.9%	8.6%	8.8%	9.0%	9.4%
		4	Count	8	3	6	7	12	36
			% within cohort	4.4%	1.7%	4.3%	6.2%	6.0%	4.5%
		5	Count	12	13	7	6	11	49

			% within cohort	6.7%	7.5%	5.0%	5.3%	5.5%	6.1%
		6	Count	1	3	2	1	2	9
			% within cohort	.6%	1.7%	1.4%	.9%	1.0%	1.1%
		7. Every day	Count	42	46	24	15	30	157
			% within cohort	23.3%	26.4%	17.3%	13.3%	15.0%	19.5%
	Total		Count	180	174	139	113	200	806
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	How Often R Read Newspaper in Last	0. None	Count		26		60	34	120
			% within cohort		29.2%		38.2%	39.5%	36.1%
		1. One day	Count		10		25	16	51
			% within cohort		11.2%		15.9%	18.6%	15.4%
		2	Count		8		23	9	40
			% within cohort		9.0%		14.6%	10.5%	12.0%
		3	Count		5		10	9	24
			% within cohort		5.6%		6.4%	10.5%	7.2%
		4	Count		7		11	6	24
			% within cohort		7.9%		7.0%	7.0%	7.2%
		5	Count		11		8	4	23
			% within cohort		12.4%		5.1%	4.7%	6.9%
		6	Count		4		1	0	5
			% within cohort		4.5%		.6%	.0%	1.5%
		7. Every day	Count		18		19	8	45
			% within cohort		20.2%		12.1%	9.3%	13.6%
	Total		Count		89		157	86	332
			% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 19 Data on How Often the Cohorts Watch the National News

Year of Study				cohort					
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	Total
1984	How Many Days R Watched National TV	0. None	Count	78					78
			% within cohort	20.1%					20.1%
		1. One day	Count	65					65
			% within cohort	16.8%					16.8%
		2	Count	63					63
			% within cohort	16.2%					16.2%
		3	Count	66					66
			% within cohort	17.0%					17.0%
		4	Count	33					33
			% within cohort	8.5%					8.5%
		5	Count	21					21
			% within cohort	5.4%					5.4%
		6	Count	14					14
			% within cohort	3.6%					3.6%
		7. Every day	Count	48					48
			% within cohort	12.4%					12.4%
	Total		Count	388					388
			% within cohort	100.0%					100.0%
1988	How Many Days R Watched National TV	0. None	Count	22	45				67
			% within cohort	11.2%	15.6%				13.8%
		1. One day	Count	16	10				26

			% within cohort	8.1%	3.5%				5.4%
		2	Count	27	31				58
			% within cohort	13.7%	10.8%				12.0%
		3	Count	20	33				53
			% within cohort	10.2%	11.5%				10.9%
		4	Count	15	20				35
			% within cohort	7.6%	6.9%				7.2%
		5	Count	20	14				34
			% within cohort	10.2%	4.9%				7.0%
		6	Count	3	8				11
			% within cohort	1.5%	2.8%				2.3%
		7. Every day	Count	74	127				201
			% within cohort	37.6%	44.1%				41.4%
	Total		Count	197	288				485
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%				100.0%
1992	How Many Days R Watched National TV	0. None	Count	33	30	42			105
			% within cohort	13.0%	14.0%	14.8%			14.0%
		1. One day	Count	19	14	24			57
			% within cohort	7.5%	6.5%	8.5%			7.6%
		2	Count	26	27	47			100
			% within cohort	10.3%	12.6%	16.6%			13.3%
		3	Count	34	29	36			99
			% within cohort	13.4%	13.5%	12.7%			13.2%
		4	Count	22	27	27			76
			% within cohort	8.7%	12.6%	9.5%			10.1%
		5	Count	27	14	28			69
			% within cohort	10.7%	6.5%	9.9%			9.2%

		6	Count	2	5	2			9
			% within cohort	.8%	2.3%	.7%			1.2%
		7. Every day	Count	90	69	77			236
			% within cohort	35.6%	32.1%	27.2%			31.4%
	Total		Count	253	215	283			751
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%			100.0%
1996	How Many Days R Watched National TV	0. None	Count	42	49	28	53		172
			% within cohort	22.1%	31.2%	23.7%	30.6%		27.0%
		1. One day	Count	25	19	21	28		93
			% within cohort	13.2%	12.1%	17.8%	16.2%		14.6%
		2	Count	32	27	15	39		113
			% within cohort	16.8%	17.2%	12.7%	22.5%		17.7%
		3	Count	26	16	18	22		82
			% within cohort	13.7%	10.2%	15.3%	12.7%		12.9%
		4	Count	18	6	11	4		39
			% within cohort	9.5%	3.8%	9.3%	2.3%		6.1%
		5	Count	18	8	11	10		47
			% within cohort	9.5%	5.1%	9.3%	5.8%		7.4%
		6	Count	5	4	0	1		10
			% within cohort	2.6%	2.5%	.0%	.6%		1.6%
		7. Every day	Count	24	28	14	16		82
			% within cohort	12.6%	17.8%	11.9%	9.2%		12.9%
	Total		Count	190	157	118	173		638
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	How Many Days R Watched National TV	0. None	Count	64	52	48	41	83	288
			% within cohort	35.6%	29.9%	34.5%	36.3%	41.9%	35.8%
		1. One day	Count	22	21	15	15	28	101

			% within cohort	12.2%	12.1%	10.8%	13.3%	14.1%	12.6%
		2	Count	21	25	26	17	27	116
			% within cohort	11.7%	14.4%	18.7%	15.0%	13.6%	14.4%
		3	Count	18	19	20	11	16	84
			% within cohort	10.0%	10.9%	14.4%	9.7%	8.1%	10.4%
		4	Count	12	9	2	8	9	40
			% within cohort	6.7%	5.2%	1.4%	7.1%	4.5%	5.0%
		5	Count	13	13	5	6	12	49
			% within cohort	7.2%	7.5%	3.6%	5.3%	6.1%	6.1%
		6	Count	1	2	3	2	1	9
			% within cohort	.6%	1.1%	2.2%	1.8%	.5%	1.1%
		7. Every day	Count	29	33	20	13	22	117
			% within cohort	16.1%	19.0%	14.4%	11.5%	11.1%	14.6%
	Total		Count	180	174	139	113	198	804
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	How Many Days R Watched National TV	0. None	Count		17		45	22	84
			% within cohort		19.1%		28.7%	25.6%	25.3%
		1. One day	Count		6		14	14	34
			% within cohort		6.7%		8.9%	16.3%	10.2%
		2	Count		15		14	14	43
			% within cohort		16.9%		8.9%	16.3%	13.0%
		3	Count		11		22	10	43
			% within cohort		12.4%		14.0%	11.6%	13.0%
		4	Count		5		17	4	26
			% within cohort		5.6%		10.8%	4.7%	7.8%
		5	Count		9		15	8	32

		% within cohort		10.1%		9.6%	9.3%	9.6%
	6	Count		1		3	2	6
		% within cohort		1.1%		1.9%	2.3%	1.8%
	7. Every day	Count		25		27	12	64
		% within cohort		28.1%		17.2%	14.0%	19.3%
Total		Count		89		157	86	332
		% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 20 Data on Who got Election Information from the Internet

Year of Study				cohort					Total
				1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	
1996	R Get Election Info from Internet	1. Yes	Count	18	12	13	22		65
			% within cohort	32.7%	27.3%	31.7%	31.9%		31.1%
		5. No	Count	37	32	28	47		144
			% within cohort	67.3%	72.7%	68.3%	68.1%		68.9%
	Total		Count	55	44	41	69		209
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
2000	R Get Election Info from Internet	1. Yes	Count	56	59	45	37	66	263
			% within cohort	51.9%	54.6%	56.3%	53.6%	53.2%	53.8%
		5. No	Count	52	49	35	32	58	226
			% within cohort	48.1%	45.4%	43.8%	46.4%	46.8%	46.2%
	Total		Count	108	108	80	69	124	489
			% within cohort	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2004	R Get Election Info from	1. Yes	Count		45		86	42	173

Internet		% within cohort		75.0%		71.7%	72.4%	72.7%
	5. No	Count		15		34	16	65
		% within cohort		25.0%		28.3%	27.6%	27.3%
Total		Count		60		120	58	238
		% within cohort		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

APPENDIX B: THE COHORT SYNTAX USED IN THIS STUDY

Figure 6 Cohort Syntax Used in this Study

```
RECODE VCF0101 (18 thru 26=1) (22 thru 30=2) (26 thru 34=3) (30 thru 38=4) (34 thru 42=5)
INTO
   age_group.
EXECUTE.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1984 & age_group=1) cohort=1.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1988 & age_group=2) cohort=1.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1992 & age_group=3) cohort=1.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1996 & age_group=4) cohort=1.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=5) cohort=1.
EXECUTE.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1988 & age_group=1) cohort=2.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1992 & age_group=2) cohort=2.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1996 & age_group=3) cohort=2.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=4) cohort=2.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=5) cohort=2.
EXECUTE.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1992 & age_group=1) cohort=3.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1996 & age_group=2) cohort=3.
```

```
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=3) cohort=3.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=4) cohort=3.
EXECUTE.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=1996 & age_group=1) cohort=4.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=2) cohort=4.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=3) cohort=4.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=4) cohort=4.
EXECUTE.

DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2000 & age_group=1) cohort=5.
EXECUTE.
DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
IF  (VCF0004=2004 & age_group=2) cohort=5.
EXECUTE.
```

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